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1.  Barry Eichengreen 
Capitalism, as Joseph Schumpeter defined it, is a process of creative 
destruction. In a market economy, one should expect new products, 
processes, and even producers to supplant their predecessors  in the 
normal course of events. Yet  Schumpeter’s metaphor provides little 
comfort to employees and shareholders of basic industries in the United 
States, all of which are suffering the effects of foreign competition. The 
American steel industry is the most dramatic case in point: between 
1979 and  1985, the number of wage employees there  declined from 
342,000 to 151,000, while the percentage rate of return on stockholders’ 
equity fell from 5.8  to -  18.5 (American Iron and Steel Institute 1986). 
Recent trends in the automobile, textile, and apparel industries, while 
somewhat less alarming, similarly convey an impression of U.S. basic 
industries in steady and perhaps irreversible decline. 
In this paper, I first document the dramatic fall in the shares of U.S. 
basic industries in domestic employment and global production. I then 
consider explanations for these industries’ relative-and,  in some in- 
stances, absolute-decline. Those explanations fall into two categories: 
domestic and international. Domestic explanations focus on the deci- 
sions of  three  sets of  actors:  management, labor, and government. 
Management is blamed for ill-advised decisions (O’Boyle 1983), labor 
for high wage costs (Kreinin 1984), government for harmful tax, trade, 
and macroeconomic policies (Bluestone and Harrison  1982). Interna- 
tional explanations focus on the tendency of the product cycle to con- 
tinually shift the production of  established products and standardized 
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processes to newly industrializing countries (due to what Alexander 
Gerschenkron called, in  now unfashionable parlance, the advantages 
of “economic backwardness”).’ Late industrializers, it is argued, while 
lacking the infrastructure to be in the forefront of innovation, have the 
advantage of  low labor and material costs when it comes to the pro- 
duction of established goods using standardized technologies. 
The problem that plagues this search for culprits should be familiar 
to fans of the board game Clue. As in Clue, the problem is one of too 
many suspects, and some method is required to eliminate candidates. 
One of  the findings of  section 5.1 is a striking contrast in  the recent 
fortunes of  the American steel industry on the one hand and the au- 
tomotive and textile industries on the other-steel  continuing to spiral 
downward, automobiles and textiles showing signs of greater stability. 
For an explanation of recent difficulties in  the basic industries to be 
convincing, it must be capable of accounting for this contrast. Much 
of the analysis that follows is organized around the contrasting expe- 
riences of these industries. 
After documenting recent trends in the U.S. basic industries, I de- 
compose those trends into components associated with the rise of com- 
peting supplies, the growth of demand, and changes in competitiveness. 
First, I consider the rise of  competing supplies, contrasting product 
cycle explanations that view shifts in the location of basic industries 
as a natural consequence of the international diffusion of standardized 
technologies with explanations that emphasize the influence of public 
policy. Evidence on the diffusion of  established technologies, while 
confirming the importance  of  the product  cycle, suggests  also that 
continued innovation in the United States can preserve important seg- 
ments of the U.S. basic industries. Next, I examine global trends in 
demand for the products of basic industries. Because there is a strong 
correlation between  the intensity of  demand-side  pressures  and the 
severity of the problems faced by the basic industries, I conclude that 
demand-side factors have played an important role in recent trends. 
Finally, I analyze factors influencing the competitiveness of  basic in- 
dustries in the United  States and abroad, ranging from labor costs, 
work conditions, management strategies, and investment decisions to 
the macro, trade, and tax policies of governments. 
A central message of this paper is that monocasual explanations for 
the recent difficulties of  U.S. basic industries conceal more than they 
reveal. Those difficulties reflect both the efficient interplay of market 
forces (driven largely by  economic development abroad) and ineffi- 
ciencies resulting from labor, management, and government decisions 
that have proven ill advised in light of  subsequent events. Insofar as 
product-cycle-based shifts in the international pattern of  comparative 
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U. S. basic industries is both inevitable-barring  measures to isolate 
the U.  S. market from international competition-and  justifiable on ef- 
ficiency grounds. Insofar as labor, management, and government de- 
cisions share responsibility, the recent difficulties of U.S. basic indus- 
tries may be at least partially reversible. 
To  the extent that these factors vary in  importance across indus- 
tries-indeed  across segments of the same industry-it  is misleading 
to offer an undifferentiated  assessment of  the prospects of the basic 
industries in the United States. Much depends on the facility with which 
different  segments of  those industries adopt new technologies  ema- 
nating from the high-tech sector. The steel industry, for example, is 
increasingly bifurcated  into a declining segment dominated by large- 
scale integrated works and a more profitable, technologically progres- 
sive segment dominated by minimills. Similarly, the application of new 
technologies holds out more promise for the survival and prosperity 
of some segments of the U.S.  automobile and textile industries than 
for others. In consequence, it is increasingly difficult to analyze the 
basic industries as a  monolithic bloc  and  even to distinguish  them 
clearly from the high-tech sector. 
5.1  Recent Trends in U.S. Basic Industries 
It is not immediately clear which industries should be defined as 
basic. Basic industries are typically thought to be those that tradition- 
ally loomed large in U.S. industrial production and have fallen recently 
on hard times: iron and steel, textiles and apparel, and motor vehicles. 
These industries are lumped together more for their long-standing im- 
portance to the U.S.  economy, their recent difficulties, and their re- 
gional concentration  than for their innate economic characteristics. 
Technically, basic  industries are those  situated far upstream  in the 
input-output table. Their products serve as inputs into production in a 
variety of  other sectors. They are distinguished by the age of the in- 
dustry and of the enterprise. Their technology is relatively standard- 
ized. Production is often capital-intensive, and there exist barriers to 
entry. Textiles, apparel, motor vehicles, and steel satisfy these criteria 
to differing extents. While the steel industry is relatively far upstream, 
aged, and capital-intensive, the speed with which its technology evolves 
resembles the high-tech industries. The textile and apparel industries, 
while relatively old and heavily dependent on standardized technolo- 
gies, are not situated so far upstream (in the sense that they rely as 
much on consumer as producer goods markets), are labor- rather than 
capital-intensive, and until recently have exhibited few entry barriers. 
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the popular  definition of  basic industries and focus on steel, motor 
vehicles, textiles, and apparel. 
Figures 5.1-5.3  show trends and fluctuations in output, employment, 
and import penetration  in  these industries since the  1973 peak.* In 
figure 5.1, the cyclical volatility of steel and motor vehicle output con- 
trasts with the relative stability of textile and apparel production. While 
textile and apparel production showed no trend through  1979, output 
in the two industries fell by  10 percent and 20  percent, respectively, 
between 1979 and 1985. In contrast, both steel and auto production fell 
sharply  during the  1973-75  and  1979-81  recessions.  While  vehicle 
production tended to make up lost ground following each cyclical down- 
turn, steel output appears to have ratcheted down to permanently lower 
levels. That ratchet effect was twice as severe in the 1979-82 recession 
as in 1973-75.  Whereas automobile production had fully recovered by 
1977, steel production remained 17 percent below 1973 levels. Similarly, 
whereas vehicle production had recovered to within 5 percent of 1979 
levels by 1985, steel production remained 35 percent below these levels. 
Trends in  employment, in figure 5.2, mirror the trends in output in 
figure 5.1  .3 Textile and apparel employment declined gradually over 
the period (as it has since World War 11), reflecting the loss of more 
than two hundred thousand jobs between 1973 and 1985 (amounting to 
nearly  10  percent of industry employment at the beginning of  the pe- 
riod). Employment in steel moved in a similar manner until 1979, after 
which it declined sharply; by 1985, employment in the steel industry 
was barely 40 percent of 1973 levels. Employment in the motor vehicle 
and equipment industries, in contrast, has been dominated not by  a 
sharp downward  trend  but  by  pronounced  cyclical fluctuations, al- 
though, as foreign-based companies establish and increase production 
in the United States, the share of  the four U.S.-based  companies in 
U.S. vehicle employment continues to decline. 
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Fig. 5.2  Trends in U.S.  basic industry employment (1973= 100). 
Together, changes in output and employment provide a perspective 
on industry adjustment. Comparing figures 5.1 and 5.2, one finds that 
only in motor vehicles did the percentage change in output significantly 
exceed the percentage change in employment between 1973 and 1985. 
In steel, employment has fallen considerably more than  output, es- 
pecially over the second half of the period when low-productivity plants 
were closed and a number of products with high labor requirements 
were abandoned. In textiles and apparel, employment has fallen slightly 
more than output, especially over the first half of  the period. In both 
of  these industries, the decline in labor-output ratios reflects substi- 
tution of capital for labor designed to increase productivity. In contrast, 
the maintenance of relatively high levels of  employment in motor ve- 
hicles, especially between 1973 and 1979, reflects anticipations of pro- 
ducers that industry demand would soon re cove^.^ 
Figure  5.3 displays  import penetration ratios  (shares of  domestic 
sales or apparent consumption accounted for by  import^).^ The reason 
for concern over imports is obvious. In all three industries, the share 
of  the domestic market  captured by  imports has risen dramatically 
since the early 1970s-from  approximately 15  percent to fully 25 per- 
cent in automobiles and steel and to nearly 35 percent in textiles. The 
timing of the import surge varies among industries, however, and there 
is no direct correspondence between movements in the import pene- 
tration ratio and trends in output and employment. In textiles and steel, 
the surge in import penetration began in 1980-81.  In the case of textiles 
it proceeded steadily, while in the case of steel it was interrupted in 
1983 and again in 1985, coincident with the implementation of two sets 
of  voluntary export restraints.  These two interruptions to the rise in 
steel imports fully account for the lower import penetration ratio in 
steel than in textiles in 1985. The case of automobiles is very different. 
The surge in import penetration began earlier, in 1978-79,  but deceler- 284  Barry Eichengreenlcharles W.  Parry/Philip Caldwell 
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Fig. 5.3  U.S. basic industry import penetration ratios, 1973-85. 
ated, leveled  off,  and ultimately  declined  in the early  1980s, again 
coinciding with the adoption of voluntary export restraints. Reinforcing 
the impression conveyed by their output and employment experiences, 
the import penetration performance of the automobile industry looks 
very different from that of textiles and steel. 
Tables 5.1-5.7  provide an international perspective on trends in basic 
industry production. Three features stand out from tables 5.1-5.3  con- 
cerned with metals production. First, there has been a dramatic shift 
in the locus of production from developed to developing countries. The 
same pattern is evident in iron and steel, nonferrous metals and metal 
products alike, as if  common market forces underlie  recent  trends. 
Second, trends in production in centrally planned economies (domi- 
nated in the 1980s by China and Romania) have tended to mirror trends 
in the developing world and hence to accentuate the international shift 
in the locus of production. Third, U.S.  output has been sustained most 
successfully in the more technologically advanced stages of production. 
As illustrated by the contrast between the 8.5 percent annual rate of 
growth of iron and steel production in developing countries and the 
2.5  percent annual rate of decline in  developed  nations,  the United 
States is not alone among developed countries in suffering a decline in 
iron and steel output (table 5.1). Even Japanese output fell between 
1974 and 1983, a trend that has accelerated recently as Japanese finished 
steel production fell by 6.3 percent between the first half of 1985 and 
the first half of  1986, Japanese exports fell by  15.5 percent, and Jap- 
anese imports (notably from South Korea, Brazil, South Africa, and 
Taiwan) rose by 51.4 percent. But the rate of decline of the U.S. share 
of world output is exceptional: the U.S. share of total world raw steel 
production fell from 17 percent in 1976 to 11 percent in 1985 (calculated 
from American Iron and Steel Institute 1986). Table 5.1  Changes in Global Iron and Steel Production, 1974-83 (percentage per annum) 
~ 
1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1974-81  1974-82  1974-83 
Developed 
Countries  0.69  -16.79  7.22  -2.01  5.10  5.02  -7.24  -0.81  -16.40  -0.09  -1.10  -2.80  -2.53 
U.S.  -2.50  -20.00  8.65  -0.88  8.93  0.00  -18.03  8.00  -37.96  14.93  -1.98  -5.98  -3.89 
Canada  5.71  -10.00  -1.11  1.12  10.00  9.09  -7.41  0.00  -22.00  5.13  0.93  -1.62  -0.95 
Japan  -2.31  -13.98  10.00  -2.27  3.49  10.11  2.04  -6.00  -3.19  -2.20  0.14  -0.23  -0.43 
EEC  3.12  -17.83  6.98  -3.26  2.69  5.82  -5.33  -3.39  -9.75  -3.49  -1.40  -2.33  -2.44 
Non-EEC  11.60  -8.26  -0.44  -1.98  4.92  8.59  -0.04  -2.26  0.11  3.64  1.52  1.36  1.59 
Countries  -6.63  31.93  15.12  7.74  7.63  16.11  6.63  7.13  -2.41  3.27  10.71  9.25  8.65 
p  I a  n  n  e  d 
economies  6.73  6.35  3.83  5.67  5.55  0.62  0.57  -9.24  -2.50  4.17  2.56  2.00  2.21 
Developing 
Centrally 
Source: Constructed from United Nations, Yearbook of  Industrial Statistics, various issues. 
Notes: Year-to-year changes may be affected by the absence of data for some countries in some years and should therefore be treated cautiously. 
In “developed countries,”  1983 excludes Australia. In “developing countries,”  (1)  1974 excludes Mexico and Hong Kong; (2) 1975 excludes Hong 
Kong; (3)  1978 excludes the Philippines; (4)  1982 excludes Colombia, Dominican Republic, Philippines, and  Sri Lanka; and (5)  1983 excludes 
Colombia, El Salvador, Peru, Dominican Republic, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, and Kenya. Table 5.2  Changes in Global Nonferrous Metals Production, 1974-83  (percentage per annum) 
~  ~  ~~  ~  ~  ~~ 













3.90  -19.74  15.83  2.82  4.26  2.64  -2.40  -2.44  -8.68 
- 10.87  -19.00  27.16  0.97  5.77  2.73  -11.50  2.00  -  18.63 
12.50  -15.00  -3.53  15.85  0.00  -7.37  13.64  1.00  -16.83 
9.30  -29.00  19.72  4.71  7.87  4.17  0.00  -4.00  -3.12 
8.80  -17.76  12.29  2.37  1.75  1.89  1.61  -5.61  -3.09 
20.25  -14.30  5.81  2.39  1.05  5.26  1.26  -4.23  0.68 
14.61  -0.87  25.50  30.39  22.78  45.28  44.61  27.72  18.10  - 
12.34  9.89  5.88  4.97  5.12  0.20  -0.28  -5.31  1.75 
2.47  0.61  -0.42  -0.13 
10.84  0.76  -  1.99  ~  1.05 
15.48  2.14  0.03  1.57 
3.23  1.60  1.07  1.29 
0.81  0.67  0.25  0.30 
6.47  2.19  2.02  2.46 
-24.69  26.25  25.35  20.32 
4.04  4.10  3.84  3.85 
Source: Constructed from United Nations, Yearbook of  Industrial Statistics,  various issues. 
Notes: Year-to-year changes may be affected by the absence of data for some countries in some years and should therefore be treated cautiously. 
In “developed  countries,”  1983 excludes Australia. In “developing  countries,”  (1) 1974 and 1975 exclude Hong Kong; (2)  1976 and 1978 exclude 
the Philippines; (3) 1982 excludes Bolivia, the Philippines, and Tunisia; (4) 1983 excludes all listed countries except Chile, India, Korea Republic, 
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Trends in nonferrous metals (tin, copper, etc.), in table 5.2, display 
a similar pattern, with production by developing countries rising dra- 
matically and that by  developed nations stagnating. Of  the country 
groups considered, only in the United  States did production fall ab- 
solutely,  however.  Even that  decline,  at a rate of  one percent  per 
annum, is small compared to the experience of iron and steel. 
Table 5.3 shows that the United States maintained its position rel- 
atively well in the more advanced stages of metal production and fab- 
rication. Despite a decline in developed country output and a rise in 
developing country production not unlike those apparent in table 5.1, 
U.S. output remained steady over the 1974-83  period, in contrast to 
the less impressive performance of the Canadian and European indus- 
tries. U.S. performance in metal fabrication in large part reflects the 
bouyant state of domestic demand, since it occurred despite a steady 
deterioration in the trade balance in steel-containing goods. 
Trends in textiles, apparel, and footwear, in tables 5.4-5.6, are more 
heterogeneous. As in metals, production tended to shift from developed 
to developing and centrally planned economies over the course of the 
decade. In comparison to metals, however,  these shifts were small, 
and in both textile and clothing the growth of output by centrally planned 
economies exceeded that  by  developing nations.  Compared to steel 
there has also been more variation in output trends within the developed 
world. In textiles, for example, North American output rose slightly, 
while production elsewhere in the OECD fell. In clothing, in contrast, 
U.S. and Japanese output contracted, while production elsewhere in 
the OECD increased. Footwear production fell sharply in the United 
States and the EEC, while remaining stable in Japan and rising else- 
where in the OECD. The heterogeneity of response suggests that vari- 
ations in trade and industrial policies (in nonmarket economies, plan- 
ning) played an even larger role in textile trade and production than in 
iron and steel. 
The experience of the global motor vehicle industry (table 5.7) con- 
trasts with that of both  textiles  and steel. Production by  developed 
countries grew respectably over the period, increasing most rapidly in 
Japan, of  course, but  expanding also in  non-EEC  Europe (notably 
Scandinavia), the  United  States and  Canada. Only  in  the  EEC did 
vehicle production actually decline. The astounding rates of growth of 
output in developing countries reflect the low levels from which pro- 
duction started in the early  1970s and the takeoff of  automobile  in- 
dustries in Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
5.2  Growth of  Competing Supplies 
As the preceding analysis makes clear, a leading influence over the 
state of  the U.S. basic industries has been the growth of  competing Table 5.3  Changes in Global Production of Metal Products, 1974-83  (percentage per annum) 
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-2.13  3.26  7.37 
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-  2.53 
0.40  11.44  29.96  13.13  32.49  22.43  26.68  25.84  15.07  -73.75  20.21  11.49  10.34 
9.34  9.50  7.27  7.75  4.16  4.13  2.56  -  1.49  2.25  2.97  5.40  5.05  4.84 
Source: Constructed from United Nations, Yearbook of  Industrial  Statistics, various issues. 
Notes: Year-to-year changes may be affected by the absence of data for some countries in some years and should therefore be treated cautiously. 
In “developed countries, EEC and non-EEC,”  1982 excludes Italy, Luxembourg, and Cyprus. In “developing countries,” (1) 1974 excludes Hong 
Kong and Indonesia; (2) 1975 excludes Hong Kong and Malaysia; (3) 1977 excludes Malaysia: (4) 1980 excludes Bangladesh and Malaysia; (5) 1981 
excludes Madagascar; (6) 1982 excludes Mexico, Dominican Republic, Sri Lanka, Bolivia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Madagascar; and (7) 1983 
excludes Mexico, Peru, Dominican Republic, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Malta, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Madagascar. Table 5.4  Changes in Global Textile Production, 1974-83  (percentage per annum) 














-  7.62 
-  2.00 
-  10.00 





-  6.67 
-7.77 
-9.13 
9.89  -2.00 
12.63  -  1.64 
2.11  3.09 
9.52  -2.17 
10.52  -4.76 
3.84  -3.53 
-1.02  5.15  1.96  -3.00 
1.83  6.05  -3.16  -2.07 
5.00  8.57  -3.51  3.64 
2.22  1.09  -  1.08  -2.17 
-2.00  5.10  -2.91  -4.00 
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-  3.23 
1.14 
-0.13 
-  0.46 
1.73 
-  1.16 
-  1.08 
-  0.89 
-0.57 
-  1.45 
-  0.61 






-  1.04 
-0.74 
-  0.70" 
2.38  1.16  6.90  0.00  3.23  2.08  2.04  0.00  -  2.00  4.08  2.22  1.75  1.99 
5.26  6.25  4.71  4.49  4.30  1.03  2.04  1.00  -0.99  2.00  3.64  3.12  3.01 
~~  ~ 
Source: Constructed from United Nations, Yearbook of Industrial  Statistics, various issues. 
Notes: Year-to-year changes may be afiected by the absence of  data for some countries in some years and should therefore be treated cautiously. 
a Excluding Cyprus. Table 5.5  Changes in Global Apparel Production, 1974-83  (percentage per annum) 
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-  1.52 
-3.09 
-0.02 
-0.45  -0.74 
0.11  -1.12 
1.31  -0.51 
-0.35  -0.14 
-0.59  -0.86 
1.88  1.74" 
-0.67 





7.89  2.44  8.33  -  1.10  4.44  3.19  3.09  7.00  0.00  3.74  4.41  3.92  3.90 
7.14  6.67  6.25  3.53  4.55  3.26  5.26  2.00  0.98  1.94  4.83  4.40  4.16 
Source: Constructed from United Nations,  Yenrbook oflndustrinl Statistics, various issues. 
Notes: Year-to-year changes may be affected by the absence of data for some countries in some years and should therefore be treated cautiously. 
a Excluding Cyprus. Table 5.6  Changes in Global Production of Footwear, 1974-83 (percentage per annum) 
1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1974-81  1974-82  1974-83 
Developed 
countries  -4.20  -3.98  0.74  -2.81  -0.63  1.50  -2.24  -2.80  -3.77  -4.58  -1.80  -2.02  -2.28 
U.S.  -9.00  -2.65  -2.73  -8.41  1.02  -2.02  3.09  -6.00  -11.70  1.20  -3.34  -4.27  -3.72 
Canada  2.39  -1.03  6.52  -8.16  11.11  8.00  -7.41  7.00  -15.89  11.11  2.30  0.28  I .36 
Japan  -1.03  0.00  0.00  1.02  3.03  3.92  -5.66  2.00  -1.96  -4.00  0.41  0.15  -0.27 
EEC  -1.48  -5.62  2.18  -0.55  -2.76  1.80  -5.46  -2.65  1.00  -4.38  -  1.82  -  1.50  -1.79 
Non-EEC  -1.31  -4.19  7.10  2.45  -2.48  9.11  9.59  1.33  -3.12  -4.76  2.70  2.05  1.37 
countries  11.82  -0.19  36.19  12.50  21.68  16.24  23.13  53.32  1.17  -88.00  21.84  19.54  8.79 
planned 
economies  7.80  6.95  3.53  4.12  5.17  3.49  2.62  -0.88  1.97  -0.33  4.01  3.79  3.37 
Developing 
Centrally 
Source: Constructed from United Nations,  Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, various issues. 
Nora: Year-to-year changes may be affected by the absence of data for some countries in some years and should therefore be treated cautiously. 
In “developed  countries,’’ 1983 excludes Australia. In “developing countries,”  (1) 1974 excludes Hong Kong and Madagascar; (2)  1975 excludes 
Hong Kong and Malaysia; (3) 1980 excludes Bangladesh and Malaysia; (4) 1981 excludes Madagascar; (5) 1982 excludes Dominican Republic, Fiji, 
India, and Madagascar; and (6) 1983 excludes all listed countries except Chile, Ecuador, Panama, and Korea Republic. Table 5.7  Changes in Global Production of Motor Vehicles, 1974-83  (percentage per annum) 
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66.18  74.77  104.86  122.14  105.58  18.02  57.32  22.26  -46.52  71.39  58.29  n.a.  n.a. 
12.7  16.72  13.93  19.56  9.06  23.00  -  0.03  -  17.17  -  0.77  103.83  9.72  8.56  18.08 
Source: Constructed from United Nations,  Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, various issues 
Notes: Year-to-year changes may be affected by the absence of data for some countries in some years and should therefore be treated cautiously. 
In “developed countries,”  (I) 1979 excludes Denmark; (2) 1980 excludes South Africa; (3) 1981 excludes Netherlands and Portugal; (4) 1982 excludes 
New Zealand; (5)  1983  excludes Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia. 
In “developing countries,” (1)  1974 excludes Hong Kong and Indonesia; (2) 1975 excludes Hong Kong and Malaysia; (3) 1978 excludes Kuwait; (4) 
1980 excludes Peru, Bangladesh, and Malaysia; (5) 1981  excludes Ecuador, El  Salvador, Peru, and Kuwait; and (6) 1982 excludes Ecuador,  El 
Salvador, Peru, Bangladesh, Fiji, India, Kuwait, and Tunisia. The abbreviation n.a. means not available. 
a  Excluding Denmark. 
Excluding Netherlands 
Excluding Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom. 
Excluding Austria, Portugal, and Sweden. 
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supplies.  Does this growth of foreign competition reflect inexorable 
shifts in the pattern of international comparative advantage, or should 
foreign government policies designed to promote the expansion of these 
industries be held responsible for recent trends? 
5.2.1  The Product Cycle 
According to models of the international product cycle, a pioneering 
producer of steel, automobiles, and textiles like the United States should 
expect its share of global output to erode as production processes are 
standardized and diffuse to newly industrializing countries. While an 
economy with a comparative advantage in  the development of  new 
products and processes will be the initial home of new industries, as 
products and processes are standardized and technological know-how 
spreads, the location of  production will shift to other countries. The 
pioneering producer will retain a productivity advantage only if its rate 
of development  of  new processes exceeds their rate of international 
diffusion. 
The first industry in which product cycle forces can be observed is 
cotton textiles.  In the nineteenth century, the mechanism by which 
industrialization initially spread from Britain to the Continent, North 
America, and then other parts of the world was the diffusion of English- 
based spinning and weaving technologies. As early importers of British 
technologies,  U.S. textile producers had begun to fear by the end of 
the nineteenth century that they were being placed at a competitive 
disadvantage by the continuing spread of textile technology to lower- 
wage parts of the world. Although innovation by the American industry 
helped stem this tide, other producers quickly began to emulate Amer- 
ican  example.  Japanese  firms, for example, after having turned  for 
advice to English machinery manufacturers in the 1870s and 1880s and 
adopting the mule spinning technology favored in Britain, quickly shifted 
to the ring spinning technology developed in the United States. The 
Japanese  industry expanded rapidly:  by the interwar period, textile 
goods accounted for fully half of Japanese exports. But as the tech- 
nology continued to diffuse, Japan’s share of world textile exports fell. 
By  the late  1950s  Japan had  begun to import textiles,  and by  1978 
imports reached 18 percent of domestic sales. In 1979, Japan’s textile 
trade balance was in deficit for the first time in modern history. 
The second phase in the textile industry product cycle, which took 
place between the late 1930s and early 1960s, was dominated by Amer- 
ican technologies for the production of synthetics and blended fibers. 
Like their predecessors, these methods were labor-intensive and readily 
emulated. Hence the location of production continued to shift toward 
the NICs, for whom the textile industry is an important source of total 
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The diffusion of  knowledge has been  accelerated by  the  aggressive 
international sales activities of textile machinery companies, including 
those based in the United States. Today more than one hundred coun- 
tries ship textile and apparel products to the United States. 
The product cycle in the steel industry has been even more dramatic, 
since it has been compressed into such a short time span. In Japan, 
for example, where the steel industry was relatively small and ineffi- 
cient prior to World War 11, the transfer of advanced technologies was 
concentrated in the twenty-five years immediately following the war. 
In the 1960s, Japanese producers greatly expanded productive capacity, 
surpassing U.S. producers in their rate of adoption of new technologies 
such as the basic oxygen furnace and in construction of large greenfield 
plants offering economies of scale. A significant aspect of these pro- 
grams was the Japanese industry’s continued dependence on foreign 
technology. As late as 1961, over 60 percent of the Japanese industry’s 
sales were dependent on technology  imported from abroad, mainly 
from the United States. Over the course of  that decade, foreign tech- 
nologies were adapted and the pace of Japanese innovation accelerated. 
By 1967 the share of  sales dependent on foreign technology had fallen 
to 8 percent, and by the 1970s Japan had begun to export technology 
to the United States (Oshima 1973, 313). 
Production by third world countries, which remain heavily dependent 
on foreign technologies, increased dramatically (by nearly 150 percent) 
between 1970 and 1980.6 While developing-country steel industries are 
only occasionally multinational,  technology transfer still takes place 
through  direct foreign involvement.  China, for example, has  relied 
successively on Soviet, Japanese, and, to a lesser extent, West German 
expertise, in  1978  signing an agreement with Nippon  Steel for the 
construction of a greenfield, fully integrated plant at Shanghai and for 
the addition of a wide hot-strip mill to existing works at Wuhan. As 
part of this agreement, the Japanese offered to train Chinese technicians 
to operate the new works. In South Korea, advanced technology has 
been transferred whole with the assistance of foreign advisers. In Bra- 
zil, an exception to the rule that steel industries tend to be indigenous, 
two of the three largest private steel companies have significant Eu- 
ropean and Japanese participation. Brazil’s new Tuberao plant is a joint 
venture with the Japanese and Italians. As a rule, however, government 
ownership predominates, and direct foreign financial involvement is 
rare. 
As in steel, technology transfer in automobile production has been 
expedited by direct foreign involvement  (often on the part of  U.S. 
firms). But in contrast to steel, the multinational form dominates. This 
has been true even of Japan, GM and Ford having operated plants there 
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designs and tooling from abroad-is  rendered difficult by foreign ex- 
change shortages like those that hindered Japanese efforts in the 1950s 
and plague developing countries today. Compared to the other basic 
industries, product cycle forces operate slowly in the automobile in- 
dustry since motor vehicles are exceedingly complex to produce and 
market. Major mechanical components such as engines and transmis- 
sions tend to be produced using automated, capital-intensive methods; 
because of  high capital and low labor requirements,  LDCs have no 
obvious comparative advantage. “Finish parts” such as exterior body 
stamping and moldings must fit precisely  and be adapted to market 
demands. Again, there may be disadvantages associated with the use 
of relatively inexperienced labor and advantages from proximity to the 
consumer. LDCs’ most obvious comparative advantage therefore lies 
in the production of minor mechanical components such as starters, 
springs, and wiring harnesses. 
While for the immediate future foreign sourcing of minor mechanicals 
is likely to remain the principal form of LDC auto production affecting 
U.S.  automakers, import competition from developing countries prom- 
ises to have an increasingly powerful impact on the economy end of 
the U.S. market. The Hyundai, imported from Korea, in 1986 enjoyed 
the highest first-year sales ever recorded by an import and undoubtedly 
figured in GM’s decision to halt  production of  its  subcompact,  the 
Chevrolet Chevette. This plus the introduction of the Yugo (manufac- 
tured in Yugoslavia) led to plans to import a similar economy car, the 
Proton Saga, from Malaysia. Meanwhile, established companies have 
developed plans to produce cars in LDCs for sale in the United States 
(Volkswagen in Brazil, Pontiac and Ford in Korea, Mercury in Mexico, 
Dodge in Thailand). For the time being, LDC competition is heavily 
concentrated at the bottom of the product line. The critical issue from 
the standpoint of U.S. companies is whether-r,  more precisely, when 
and to what extent-these  countries will begin to penetrate other seg- 
ments of the American market. 
5.2.2  Government Policy 
Even while product cycle influences were shifting the locus of basic 
industry production from the United States to other parts of the world, 
foreign government policies could have been operating simultaneously 
to speed the process. The recent debate over the extent and effective- 
ness of foreign industrial targeting and export subsidization focuses on 
the latter set of  influences. Following Krugman (1984), it is useful to 
distinguish three categories of policy: financial support (such as tax 
relief and privileged access to capital markets),  control of  product 
market access (through tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and adrninis- 
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the encouragement of mergers, joint ventures, and collusive pricing 
policies). 
The efficacy of these policies might be judged according to several 
criteria. Did they raise foreign output, employment, and exports? Did 
they reduce foreign production costs? Did the returns on these policies 
exceed the costs from a national point of view? Finally, and this is the 
criterion relevant here, did foreign policies accentuate the shift in basic 
industry production from the United  States and contribute  to U.S. 
industry’s competitive difficulties? 
The extent to which governments have promoted the growth of their 
basic industries is notoriously difficult to quantify. How, for example, 
is one to measure the impact of moral suasion designed to encourage 
banks to lend money to enterprises in a particular sector? Despite these 
difficulties, some general conclusions about the impact of policy on the 
basic industries can be offered. It is clear, for example, that policy 
played an important role in the growth of  the Japanese steel and au- 
tomobile industries in the 1950s; in the 1970s and 1980s, in comparison, 
its influence has been  much diminished.  In the  1950s, the Japanese 
steel market was protected by stringent import restrictions which in- 
creased the profitability of domestic production and permitted the in- 
dustry to produce at minimum efficient scale. Low-interest loans and 
tax concessions provided added incentive to invest. Although these 
policies remained in place into the 1970s, by the mid-1960s Japanese 
competitiveness had  improved  to a point  where  import restrictions 
were redundant.  By  the mid-l970s, policy shifted toward restraining 
the industry’s growth to avoid exacerbating trade conflicts with other 
industrial countries. 
As in steel, the growth of Japan’s automobile industry was stimulated 
in the 1950s by prohibitive barriers to imports and by statutes requiring 
that companies be Japanese owned. Half the cost of a new automobile 
factory could be written off in the first year of operation. In the 1980s, 
in  contrast, few such tax concessions have been available. Over the 
entire period 1966-81,  Nissan paid an average effective corporate tax 
rate of 35 percent.’ 
Although various tax and financial incentives have been provided 
the Japanese textile industry, the government’s basic strategy has been 
one of not interfering with the decline of employment. The share of 
textile manufacturing in Japanese employment fell from 23 percent in 
1955 to 13.2 percent in 1979, with 18 percent of Japanese textile jobs 
lost  in  the  1970s alone.  The  late  1970s saw  more  than a thousand 
Japanese textile firm bankruptcies per annum. The implications of these 
developments for Japanese output are evident in tables 5.4 and 5.5. 
Some steps were  taken  to slow the industry’s contraction, notably 
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dise, modernization of equipment, and investment in R&D. But despite 
these examples to the contrary, Japanese textile-industry policy has 
generally emphasized adjustment rather than job retention. 
Policy in Europe, in contrast, has focused more directly on stemming 
the decline of basic industry employment. In the early 1970s, govern- 
ment initiatives tended to be indirect, taking the form of measures to 
encourage private  lending for rationalization  and modernization, for 
example. Funds for the French steel industry were raised through gov- 
ernment efforts to promote the formation of an industrywide syndicate 
to market bonds to the small investor. Banks were encouraged by the 
state to aid in the industry’s modernization. As the financial condition 
of Europe’s basic industries worsened, however, governments became 
increasingly involved directly in the provision of financial assistance. 
In  1978 the French government implemented a restructuring program 
that guaranteed the industry’s debkg  In several other European coun- 
tries, transfers from general revenues have been needed to permit pub- 
licly owned companies to service debt and continue operations. Sub- 
sidies and grants extended to the steel industry by members of the EC 
have been estimated at 70 billion DM between 1980 and 1985 (Gerken, 
Gross, and Lachler 1986,775). Most of these measures have been taken 
in concert through the offices of the EC Commission. 
As with its policy toward steel, the objective of European  textile 
policy has been to prevent the erosion of employment. Starting in the 
1970s, Belgium, Italy, and the United  Kingdom offered textile firms 
substantial subsidies and in some cases experimented with nationaliza- 
tion. In Norway, the textile industry was provided relief from social 
security payments and financial support for investment in machinery. 
France  provided  transitional assistance to small- and medium-sized 
firms and subsidized technological research to increase productivity. 
The Netherlands initially permitted the market to operate freely but, 
once more than half of all textile jobs in Holland disappeared between 
1970 and 1976, intervened with loans and with investment and current 
expenditure subsidies for cotton, rayon, linen, and clothing producers. 
If anything, the scope of such policies has expanded in  recent years. 
France, for example, recently announced a program providing relief 
from social security contributions to textile firms that maintain or in- 
crease employment and investment. The Belgian government recently 
proposed extending loans and interest rate subsidies to firms promising 
to retain at least 90 percent of their labor forces (Toyne et al.  1984, 
Have these policies contributed in important ways to the competitive 
difficulties of U.S. basic industries? Krugman (1984) argues no. Taking 
steel as an example, he points out that Japanese policies  served to 
subsidize industry expansion in the 1950s but not subsequently. One 
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would have to document persistent links from the learning effects of 
the 1950s to costs of  production in the 1970s in order to establish the 
relevance of Japanese subsidies to current trends in competitiveness. 
Krugman argues further that  European policies have been  “more a 
bailout for bondholders than a subsidy for production or for the creation 
of new capacity”  (p. 117). 
It is true that the direct effects of Japanese policies are small; one 
study estimates that between  1951 and  1975, loans by public institu- 
tions, export promotion  schemes, and other assistance measures re- 
duced the cost of  a net ton of Japanese steel by no more than $0.45 
US (out of an estimated Japanese cost of production in 1975 of roughly 
$150 US) (Mueller and Kawahito 1978, 25-26).  Nearly every study of 
government assistance to the Japanese steel industry has arrived at 
similar conclusions. But European subsidies, in contrast with Japan’s, 
have not been uniformly small; studies of European financial assistance 
to the steel industry  in  the  mid-1970s yielded  estimates of  implicit 
subsidies in the range of $2 US per net product ton. 
Even if  European financial policies did not increase production or 
stimulate the creation of new capacity, as Krugman concludes, they 
surely prevented production and capacity from shrinking at the rates 
that would have been dictated by market forces alone. Even if European 
production subsidies and import restraints have primarily affected Jap- 
anese exporters, the U.S. industry is indirectly  affected due to the 
integration of global commodity markets. Japanese steel exports that 
might be sold in Europe in the absence of governmental intervention 
there tend to be diverted to other countries, leading other producers, 
who might have concentrated on those markets in the absence of Jap- 
anese competition, to divert their own exports to still other markets, 
including that of the United States. Due to market integration, the mere 
fact that subsidies to the steel industry have been relatively generous 
in countries not among the leading exporters to the United States does 
not establish that they were without implications for the competitive- 
ness of  American producers.  Policies increasing supply or restricting 
demand tend to have indirect repercussions on the United States wher- 
ever they occur. 
Observers have argued further that Japanese firms have been favored 
by privileged access to borrowed funds, as a result of which their basic 
industries have enjoyed an artificially low cost of  capital. The only 
systematic comparison of  the corporate cost of capital in Japan and 
the United States, that of Ando and Auerbach (1985), suggests that, 
while this may have been true for the economy as a whole, the argument 
has not applied to the basic industries since the mid-1960s. Ando and 
Auerbach compare price-earnings ratios for samples of Japanese and 
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samples of roughly twenty U.S. and twenty Japanese companies for 
the period  1966-81,  the median average return to (or cost of) capital 
is 10.3 percent for the United States and 9.5  percent for Japan. In other 
words, Japanese firms were able to pay their shareholders a rate of 
return 0.8 percent less than that required of their American counter- 
parts. While the differences initially appear to be larger for steel and 
autos (in both industries, Japanese firms have substantially lower re- 
turns on, and costs of, capital than their U.S. counterparts), corrections 
for depreciation, inventories, and inflation change the pi~ture.~  While 
tending to further increase the cost-of-capital advantage for the Japa- 
nese economy as a whole, these corrections raise the returns to the 
U.S. steel and auto industries compared to their Japanese counterparts. 
For example, the before-tax cost of capital for U.S. Steel is estimated 
at 17.8 percent, compared with 22.0 percent for Kawasaki and 23.1 for 
Nippon Steel. Costs of capital for Ford and GM averaged 15.5 percent 
and 17.3 percent respectively, compared with 18.4 percent for Nissan. 
Adjustments for taxation only reinforce the conclusion, since Japanese 
industry in general and auto and steel firms in particular paid higher 
corporate taxes than their U.S. counterparts. Thus, if Japanese firms 
benefited from a lower cost of capital, the benefits did not extend to 
autos and steel. And, since the 1960s, direct government policy in the 
form of  corporate tax policy has not worked in favor of Japan's basic 
industries. 
5.3  Lagging Demand 
The U.S. steel, textile,  and automobile  industries are all import- 
competing industries. Hence domestic market growth largely deter- 
mines the state of industry demand. 
The U.S. basic industries have all suffered from secular declines in 
demand, but to differing extents. The most dramatic decline, that ex- 
perienced by the steel industry, is portrayed in figure 5.4,  which shows 
U.S.  apparent steel consumption relative to real GNP and its trend 
over a longer period starting in  1960. Although domestic steel use fell 
significantly over the period as a whole, domestic demand exhibited 
little trend in the 1960s but declined significantly after 1972 and again 
after 1978.1° 
The downward  trend in  U.S.  steel consumption relative  to GNP 
reflects the tendency of the steel intensity of production to decline as 
the economy matures."  Phases of rapid industrial expansion and re- 
construction like those that followed World War I1 require inputs of 
steel for the construction of railroads, bridges, port facilities, power 
stations, and other infrastructure. Eventually, investment in infrastruc- 
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needs steel bridges for only one interstate highway network, for ex- 
ample. Figure 5.4 suggests that the United States had reached this stage 
of declining steel intensity by the early 197Os.l2 
Simultaneously, technological change created increasingly attractive 
substitutes for steel. Steel has been replaced by plastic and concrete 
tubing in many types of  construction, by aluminum and plastic in the 
production  of  food  and beverage containers, by  plastics  in  various 
stages of  automobile production. In several applications, notably au- 
tomobiles,  the shift toward lighter materials was accentuated by the 
energy price shocks of 1973 and 1979. In 1973, when 14.5 million ve- 
hicles were sold, Detroit consumed 23 million tons of  steel; in  1985, 
15.7 million vehicles accounted for only  13 million tons, a fall of 48 
percent per unit.13 The shift toward steel substitutes also can be seen 
as a corollary of economic maturity, as increasingly sophisticated tech- 
nologies require the use of thinner and more formable materials. While 
there exist countervailing trends, such as the substitution of steel for 
timber, brick, and concrete in construction, overall these developments 
have tended to reduce the steel intensity of production (Keeling 1982, 
Figure 5.4 also reflects the cyclical sensitivity of steel consumption. 
During business cycle downturns, firms delay investment projects and 
consumers defer purchases  of  durables. The ratio of  apparent steel 
consumption to real GNP therefore rises significantly during recoveries 
and falls during recessions.  l4 Consequently, the absence of  a notable 
decline of steel intensity in the 1960s is attributable in part to the relative 
buoyancy of the macroeconomy over the period. Analogously, slower 
growth over much of the period since 1973 and the exceptional severity 





I960  1965  1970  I975  I900  1985 
Apparent steel consumption in ingots as a ratio of GNP at 
1982 prices. 301  International Competition in the Products of U.S. Basic Industries 
U. S. textile producers also have experienced stagnant domestic de- 
mand due to shifts in expenditure shares and a slowly growing ma- 
croeconomy. Global consumption of textiles has been rising less quickly 
than total manufacturing production since the early 1960s. The income 
elasticity of  demand for clothing is less than unity and is thought to 
fall with rising incomes.  l5 Consumers’ expenditure  on clothing and 
shoes as a percentage of total private consumption in the United States, 
calculated in current prices as in figure 5.5, has declined from nearly 
9.5  percent in 1960 to less than 7 percent.16  Measured in constant prices, 
that share has been more stable; while the constant-price share trends 
down over the period  as a whole, most of its decline occurs in  the 
decade of the sixties. Thus, it appears to be mainly falling prices rather 
than income inelastic demands or shifting expenditure patterns that 
account for the industry’s demand-side difficulties. But the aggregate 
figures mask a shift toward casual wear at the expense of formal attire, 
stimulating the demand for the products of some segments of the in- 
dustry while depressing the demand for others. 
Motor vehicle apparent consumption as a share of GNP, shown in 
figure 5.6, while even more volatile than the share of steel, exhibits an 
almost imperceptible downward trend.  Trends in the share of spend- 
ing on new motor vehicles in  GNP can be decomposed into effects 
associated with changes in average vehicle life,  “saturation”  of the 
automobile market, and changes in the relative cost of purchasing and 
operating vehicles.  The rising average age of passenger cars in use, 
from 5.7 years in 1973 to 7.5 years in 1984, reflects the combination of 
improving durability and relatively slow income growth over the period. 
Both the average price of a new car of constant quality and the real 
cost per mile of  operating a passenger car actually declined between 
1970 and 1983.18 In 1984 the number of cars per thousand population 
Fig. 5.5  Share of  clothing in personal consumption (current prices), 
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Fig. 5.6  Motor vehicle apparent consumption as percentage of GNP. 
reached 549 in the United States, by far the world's highest (computed 
from Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures  '85).  OECD estimates put the 
saturation point at 700, however, suggesting that the industry is still 
far from wholly dependent on replacement demand (cited in Altshuler 
et al.  1984, 110). Thus, not only does the automobile industry differ 
from textiles and steel in that demand has remained relatively stable, 
but neither the saturation nor the operating cost argument provides 
much basis for pessimism about future demands. At the end of  1984 
the Commerce Department forecast that the number of passenger cars 
sold in North America would rise by 11 percent between 1985 and 1990 
(U.S. Department of  Commerce 1984, 60). The principal factor likely 
to depress the quantity of  new vehicles demanded is a rise in their 
relative price, perhaps due in part to the restrictive effect of voluntary 
export restraints on foreign producers. The effects of these restraints, 
which tend to raise the share of U.S. consumer expenditure on pas- 
senger cars even while depressing the quantity sold in the domestic 
market, are discussed in the section on trade policy below. But it is 
already clear that divergent trends in demand play an important role 
in  explaining the differing fortunes of the automobile and textile in- 
dustries on the one hand and iron and steel on the other. 
5.4  Private Sector Determinants of  Competitiveness 
5.4.1 
No factor that figures in the debate over the competitiveness of U.S. 
basic industries has attracted more attention than labor costs (see, for 
example, Gomez-Ibanez and Harrison 1982). The importance of labor 
costs is incontrovertible: labor accounts for 46 percent of total costs 
in motor vehicles  (Kreinin  1984, 41), roughly 28  percent of average 
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Fig. 5.7  Hourly earnings in U.S. basic industries (all manufacturing 
= loo). 
total costs in  steel (down from 39 percent in  1976; see Mueller and 
Kawahito 1978, 19), and for the great majority of manufacturing costs 
in apparel. The question is the extent to which high wages have con- 
tributed to competitive difficulties, particularly in automobiles and steel, 
and who bears the burden of responsibility. 
Figure 5.7 shows trends over the last two decades in the average 
hourly earnings of employees in  U.S. basic industries relative to all 
manufacturing employees. The need to distinguish among basic indus- 
tries is again obvious. While earnings in textiles and apparel are only 
75 percent of  average manufacturing earnings and in the latter case 
have continued to decline, steel and vehicle earnings are at least  125 
percent  of  the manufacturing  average, with the differential favoring 
automotive workers rising slowly and that favoring steelworkers rising 
rapidly until 1982. The steelworkers’ premium rose from 26 percent in 
1970 to 64 percent in 1981-82,  before falling to 43 percent in  1985.19 
Productivity growth has not offset trends in labor costs, if  anything 
exacerbating them instead. While hourly output in all manufacturing 
rose between 1977 and 1982, it changed only slightly in motor vehicles 
and declined markedly in iron and steel. Table 5.8 shows trends over 
time in U.S. unit labor costs (hourly labor costs adjusted for produc- 
tivity). Nominal unit labor costs for all employees, which rose by 30 
percent in all manufacturing between 1977 and 1982, rose by 56 percent 
in vehicles and 72 percent in steel. The impact on costs of the rise in 
steelworkers’ hourly earnings, which was one and two-thirds as rapid 
as in all manufacturing, was reinforced by a 10 percent decline in output 
per hour. The rise in autoworkers’ hourly earnings, which was one and 
a half times as rapid as in all manufacturing, was not offset by a rel- 
atively small increase in labor productivity. Table 5.8  Percentage Increase of  Average Hourly Earnings (current dollars) and in Output per Hour of Labor input, Selected Periods 
Hourly Earnings  Output per Hour  Unit Labor Cost 
All  Production  All  Production  All  Production 
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Source: Anderson and Kreinin 1981 and author’s calculations. Calculations from data in United Stutes Census of Manufactures, for 1957, 1967, 1972, 
1977, and 1985, Bureau of  the Census, U.S. Department of  Commerce, Washington, D.C., for hourly earnings; Handbook oflubor  Srutistics, 1978 
and 1985, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of  Labor, Washington, D.C., for output per hour in aggregate manufacturing; and Productivity 
Indexesfor Selected Industries, 1979, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., for SIC 331 and 371. 
a. Nonproduction workers are assumed to work the same annual hours as production workers. 
b. Output is gross domestic product (GDP) originating. 
c. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 331; output is a physical production series constructed by the Bureau of  Labor Statistics. 
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Identifying the reasons for these earnings differentials is rendered 
difficult by the fact that they incorporate skill differentials, variations 
across industries in the use of cooperating factors (capital-labor ratios), 
differences in the organization of  production, and differences in bar- 
gaining power. A significant portion of the differentials can be explained 
on the first three grounds without an appeal to market power or labor- 
market imperfections. A crude measure of  skill differentials is educa- 
tional attainment: in 1975, 30 percent and 35 percent of the workforce 
in textiles and apparel, respectively, had less than a ninth grade edu- 
cation, compared to 16 percent for U.S. industry as a whole (derived 
from U.S. Department of Labor 1975). This contrasts with 18 percent 
in primary metals, 15  percent in fabricated metals, and 12 percent in 
transport equipment. Since women comprise some 80 percent of  ap- 
parel industry employees, in part because the industry provides a con- 
venient port of  entry for new labor force participants, the growth of 
female labor force participation may have depressed apparel industry 
wages by increasing the relevant labor supply. Yet  Krueger and Sum- 
mers (1986) find that controlling for age, education, and gender, among 
other variables, fails to eliminate most of the observed variation in 
interindustry wages. Even with controls, basic industry wages in 1984 
differed from average wages by  19 percent in transport equipment, 18 
percent in primary metals,  -2  percent in textiles, and -  16 percent in 
apparel. Krueger and Summers argue that the interdependence of tasks 
encourages the payment of efficiency wages in steel and autos which 
account for a portion of the differentials. In textiles and apparel, the 
diligence of  workers is readily  monitored  through the inspection of 
output and the payment of  piece rates,  and the costs of  employee 
turnover are relatively low because of the lesser importance of  firm- 
specific skills. In steel and autos, in contrast, laborers work coopera- 
tively, rendering their effort difficult to observe. In addition, turnover 
costs may be relatively high, making it efficient for firms to pay wage 
premia to attract and retain suitable employees. 
None of these factors provides an obvious explanation for the grow- 
ing differential between steel and automotive wages on the one hand 
and textile  and apparel wages on the other, or for the surge in the 
premium enjoyed by steelworkers after 1970. This leaves the actions 
of unions and management. It appears that the two share responsibility 
for the surge in the steelworkers’ premium after 1970 and that import 
competition played a critical role. When attempting to rationalize the 
rise in steel imports that occurred in the 1960s, management tended to 
focus on the threat of disruptions of domestic supply. A famous 116- 
day strike in  1959 forced U.S.  steel users to search out alternative 
sources. As foreign supplies came to be seen as less volatile and un- 
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three years when contracts were  negotiated  and strike threats were 
renewed. Perceiving uncertainty about the availability of domestic sup- 
plies as the main factor contributing to the rise in import penetration 
and anticipating a strong domestic market for steel, management at- 
tempted to remove supply disruptions starting in 1974 by offering steel- 
workers real wage increases of not less than 3 percent per annum in 
return for foregoing the right to strike. It was easier for management 
to blame labor militancy than management decisions for the difficulty 
of  competing with imports. While removing the cloud of uncertainty 
covering domestic supplies, this “experimental negotiating agreement” 
and its successors contributed greatly to the surge in  steel industry 
labor costs. Thus, management and labor strategies led to the adoption 
of  policies  that  in  the  long  run  exacerbated  problems  of  cost 
competitiveness. 
Only in 1983 did the accord break down. By that time the relationship 
of cost competitiveness to import penetration could no longer be de- 
nied. Management shifted its attention from supply disruptions to com- 
parative labor costs, while labor, out of growing concern for employ- 
ment, moderated its position on wages, negotiating a 9 percent reduction 
in total compensation in the first year  of  the new steel contract. In 
1985, for the first time in twenty-five years, the United Steelworkers 
of  America (USWA) struck a major  steel company (Wheeling-Pitts- 
burgh) after the  company had  filed  for bankruptcy  and unilaterally 
imposed court-approved reductions in wages and benefits20  Thus, both 
the rise and fall of  the steelworkers’ premium coincide with changes 
in management and labor strategy. 
Alternative explanations for changes in labor costs are less satisfac- 
tory. Appealing to the presence of  unions is insufficient; even in the 
low-wage apparel industry, more than half of employees were unionized 
in  1975.21  Granting that unions in steel and autos were more cohesive 
than those in textiles and apparel, it remains unclear that their actions 
can account for the surge in the differential. Economic theory suggests 
that members of unions that effectively restrict entry will have higher 
wages than nonmembers, not that the differential will rise over time. 
Nor can the fact that union wage premiums tend to rise in recessions 
account for these trends in light of the almost uninterrupted rise in the 
steelworkers’ premium over the decade of the 1970s. And while union 
workers, particularly members of the UAW  and USWA, have had their 
positions protected by generous cost-of-living escalators, their earnings 
premiums rose uniformly in periods of low and high inflation alike.22 
If the UAW  or USWA were responsible for the widening differential, 
therefore, this must reflect changes in their bargaining power or strat- 
egy. In simple models (e.g., Oswald 1982), the level of wages for which 
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insofar as foreign competition has increased the price elasticity of final 
demand for the products of U.S. basic industries and, ceteris paribus, 
the elasticity of their derived demands for labor, this should have weak- 
ened the unions’ bargaining power and reduced, not increased, the 
differential.  Although voluntary restraint  agreements have  strength- 
ened the bargaining position of U.S. auto- and steelworkers over what 
it would have been otherwise, the continued rise in  the import share 
of the U.S. market suggests that foreign competition has weakened the 
bargaining position of the unions on balance. Moreover, the decline in 
the share of steel- and autoworkers unionized suggests that changes in 
labor market power have been working in the wrong direction. 
This brings us to union strategy, the factor emphasized by Lawrence 
and Lawrence (1985). They suggest that the price elasticity of demand 
for labor is an increasing function of investment-that  industries en- 
gaged in new investment are better able to substitute plant and equip- 
ment for labor when unions attempt to raise wages, thereby restraining 
wage demands. Declining industries in which investment is unprofitable 
are incapable  of  responding  in  this  way, providing an incentive for 
unions to capture remaining profits by raising wages, a phenomenon 
known as “scooping.” 
The Lawrence and Lawrence interpretation has the virtue of con- 
sistency with recent trends in the automotive industry, where guarded 
optimism  over medium-term prospects  has  sustained investment  in 
recent years and declining automobile sales and plant closings starting 
in 1979 led to an immediate moderation in wage trends. After reporting 
record losses, Chrysler management entered national contract nego- 
tiations in 1979 and obtained a contract under which the UAW  agreed 
to $203 million in wage concessions over three years. GM and Ford 
negotiated new contracts six months prior to the scheduled expiration 
of existing agreements; as at Chrysler, automatic wage increases both 
for inflation and other reasons were deferred. Only when industry con- 
ditions improved were traditional wage rules reinstated. This interpre- 
tation also provides a consistent explanation for the rise in steelwork- 
ers’ wages relative to those of  autoworkers, assuming that the steel 
industry’s future was recognized as bleak from the early  1970s while 
the auto industry was expected to survive. This, however, imputes a 
remarkable degree of foresight to union leaders and fails to explain the 
falling steel industry premium after 1982. One might attempt to finesse 
this objection by positing that the U.S.  steel industry is made up of 
two segments-an  integrated sector facing terminal competitive diffi- 
culties, in which unions have been engaged in scooping, and another 
comprised of plants that can survive, in which unions have not engaged 
in  this practice. The wave of plant closings since the early  1980s has 
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in the steel earnings premium for the industry as a whole. Ultimately, 
however, the problem with this explanation is the implausibility of the 
notion that as long as fifteen years ago steelworkers recognized  the 
future prospects of  their industry as bleak, particularly in light of the 
optimism that pervaded the U.S. steel market in the mid-1970s. 
How much labor cost differentials matter for international compet- 
itiveness  depends on unit labor costs abroad. Comparing unit labor 
costs across countries is rendered difficult by differences in data, dif- 
ferences in product mix, and exchange rate fluctuations. The Depart- 
ment of  Labor’s estimates of hourly compensation, which attempt to 
adjust for these problems, are summarized in table 5.9.23  Although these 
estimates should be regarded  as approximations, it is clear, whether 
the comparison is for 1975 or 1985, that the ratio of  U.S. to foreign 
labor costs is higher in automobiles and steel than in all manufacturing, 
whatever foreign country is considered. The U.S. steelworkers’ and 
autoworkers’ wage premiums that emerged in the 1970s were without 
counterpart in other countries. The only exceptions are Japanese steel- 
and autoworkers who, like their U.S. counterparts, are better paid than 
the average manufacturing worker. Still, at market exchange rates, U.S. 
steel and automotive wages were in 1975 and 1985 roughly double those 
of Japan. 
Textiles and apparel exhibit a different pattern. In contrast to the 
United  States, where textile and apparel workers earn less than the 
average manufacturing worker, in most developing countries they earn 
more.  Nonetheless,  there  remains a dramatic labor cost differential 
between the Asian and Latin American industries on the one hand and 
those of industrial countries (including the United States) on the other. 
The United States is not alone; as early as 1975, textile and apparel 
wages in many European countries exceeded those in the United States. 
That they fell back below U.S. levels in  1985 illustrates the power of 
exchange rate  movements to bring about dramatic  shifts in relative 
labor costs (see section 5.5 and especially table 5.15 below). 
To assess their implications for competitiveness, labor costs must be 
adjusted for productivity. Table 5.10 presents trends in unit labor costs 
in iron and steel in five countries since 1964.24  It speaks to the question 
of  whether unit labor costs in the United States have been rising rel- 
atively rapidly over time, thereby contributing the industry’s compet- 
itive difficulties. Before  1977, steel-industry unit labor costs actually 
rose less rapidly in the United States. The U.S.-Japanese comparisons 
are of particular interest. Although Japanese labor productivity nearly 
tripled in a period when U.S. output per worker hour rose by only 16 
percent, hourly earnings rose much more rapidly in Japan, reflecting 
the low level from which they started. Even though U.S. labor costs 
have been higher than Japan’s, this shrinking disadvantage cannot ac- Table 5.9  International Comparisons of Hourly Compensation, Production Workers, 1975-85,  Relative to the United States 
(US. = loo) 
1975  1985= 
Autos  Steel  Textilesb  Apparelb  Autos  Steel  Textilesb  Apparelb 




















































































- Table 5.9  (continued) 
1975  1985" 
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Source: U.S. Department of  Labor 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1986d, 1986e. 
Nore: Table includes nonwage earnings. 
aProvisional estimates. 
b1984. 
CJapan:  autos include motorcycles; Spain: autos include all transportation equipment. 311  International Competition in the Products of  U.S. Basic Industries 
Table 5.10  Unit Labor Costs in Iron and Steel, Five Countries, 1964-81,  AU 
Employees (1964  = 100) 
United  United 
States  Japan  France  Germany  Kingdom 
Output per hour 
1964  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1972  116.1  219.8  157.1  157.7  130.0 
1977  116.0  290.7  172.4  178.6  117.5 
1982  107.0  315.7  222.2  212.0  156.9 
1964  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1972  160.7  277.4  214.8  210.9  206.1 
1977  277.0  645.1  529.1  362.3  507.6 
1982  496.3  887.0  1,076.2  495.7  1,035.0 
Hourly labor costa 
Unit labor cost 
(US  dollars) 
1964  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1972  138.4  150.8  132.7  166.6  142.5 
1977  238.7  300.3  305.8  347.2  271.0 
1982  463.7  408.7  360.5  382.6  414.6 
Source: U.S.  Department of  Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 1984. 
ahdudes  nonwage earnings. 
count for the American steel industry’s continued loss of market share 
relative to Japan or for the industry’s worsening (as opposed to per- 
sisting) competitive difficulties. 
After 1977, conditions changed. The rise in hourly labor costs in the 
United States vastly exceeded the comparable rise in Japan. And while 
Japanese labor productivity  rose, U.S. productivity fell. In part pro- 
ductivity trends reflect declining U .S. capacity utilization relative to 
capacity utilization in Japan, which may itself reflect the competitive- 
ness  effects with  which we are concerned  but  in any case tends to 
exaggerate the underlying productivity differential.  Nonetheless, the 
different trends are indicative of a rapidly worsening unit cost problem 
for the United States in the second half of  the 1970s. 
Fuss and Waverman (1985,  1986) find a similar situation in motor 
vehicles. They estimate that the trend rate of productivity growth in 
motor vehicles during the period 1970-80  was 4.3 percent per annum 
in Japan compared to only 1.6 percent per annum in the United States. 
By 1980, American producers, who possessed a considerable produc- 
tivity advantage over their Japanese competitors at the beginning of 
the 1970s, had fallen behind. Combined with the labor cost differential 
apparent in Fuss and Waverman’s table 4.2, U.S. producers were at a 
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steel, U.S. producers’ competitive difficulties were reinforced by rel- 
atively low levels of capacity utilization. 
5.4.2 
Labor productivity is not an exogenous variable to which labor costs 
must adapt. It depends prominently on four sets of  factors: labor re- 
lations, the organization of work, physical investment, and technolog- 
ical change. Labor relations have attracted particular attention in the 
automotive industry, where Japanese work organization is sometimes 
viewed as a panacea for productivity  ills. Reflection and experimen- 
tation have led to the realization that, while Japanese modes of orga- 
nization  provide  useful  lessons for American  industry, it  is  neither 
feasible nor desirable simply to transplant Japanese approaches. Among 
the lessons is the inefficiency of  an adversarial labor-management re- 
lationship which neither vests workers with responsibility for product 
quality nor taps their knowledge of  the production process, and the 
ability of an implicit contract promising job security to reduce workers’ 
fear that increased efficiency will lead to redundancy.  How to apply 
these lessons in the U.S. context is the unanswered question. 
In response to the Japanese example, automotive companies have 
adopted a variety of “employee involvement programs.”25  In the early 
1970s, experiments were conducted replacing the assembly line with 
work teams. Initially, sharp separation was maintained between changes 
in work organization and bargaining over compensation, in contrast to 
Japan. With the expansion of quality- and productivity-related activities 
following the 1979 slump in auto sales, however, negotiations over work 
organization have become increasingly integrated with compensation 
issues,  with  union  leaders trading  changes  in  work  rules  and work 
conditions for changes in compensation and profit sharing. 
To  date, there exist no systematic comparisons of productivity in 
otherwise equivalent plants using assembly line and team production 
methods. Insofar as the main effect of the latter has been to increase 
the flow of information between labor and management, it is hard to 
see how it could fail to increase productivity. Whether the productivity 
increase is large is the open question. 
5.4.3  Investment 
The other central determinants of productivity growth are investment 
and technical progress. Insofar as technical progress in the steel, auto, 
and textile industries tends to be embodied in new plant and equipment, 
the importance of  investment is heightened. Investment in the basic 
industries depends both on macroeconomic conditions and on sector- 
specific factors. To  highlight the latter, figure 5.8 shows investment in 
U .S. basic industries as shares of  total manufacturing investment.26 
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Fig. 5.8  Basic  industry  shares  of total  manufacturing investment, 
1972-85. 
After declining slightly in the early  1970s, investment in  the textile 
industry has remained steady, even rising slightly as a share of man- 
ufacturing investment in the early  1980s. The share of automotive in- 
vestment is more volatile but, like textiles and in  contrast to steel, 
shows no decisive downward trend. The dramatic fall in steel industry 
investment over the past decade indicates that modernization has not 
proceeded at the same rate that it has in the textile and auto industries 
and provides  additional evidence that future prospects  for the U.S. 
steel industry are bleaker than those for textiles and autos. 
Textile industry investment reflects attempts to cut costs rather than 
to expand capacity. Increasing the capital intensity of production en- 
ables firms to minimize the consequences of relatively high U.S. wages.” 
Open-ended spinning (which produces four to five times the output of 
ring  spindles),  the air-jet loom (which is three times  as fast as the 
conventional shuttle), and computerized finishing are viewed as essen- 
tial elements of the campaign to increase productivity. That investment 
has been maintained despite more than 250 plant closings since 1979 
suggests that a leaner but more modern textile industry will survive 
into the foreseeable future. In these respects the situation in automo- 
biles is similar to that in textiles, although there have been instances 
in recent  years where capacity expansion has figured in  investment 
decisions. 
The behavior of steel industry investment-or disinvestment-differs 
markedly from the automotive and textile  cases.  Spokesmen assert 
that the American steel industry is vigorously “building for the future” 
by investing in new technologies.28 However, calculations by Barnett 
and Schorsch (1983, chap. 6) suggest that industry investment has been 
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1970~.*~  In the last five years, new expenditures have done little to 
offset depreciation of existing capital. Moreover, before 1980 much of 
this investment took the form of the development of new iron ore mines 
and iron pelletizing facilities, from which a shrunken integrated sector 
now derives little benefit. Since 1980, much of the investment that has 
been undertaken has gone into the construction of minimills rather than 
the updating of integrated works. Crandall(1985) calculates that Tobin’s 
q (the market value of capacity in place relative to its replacement cost) 
is on the order of 0.1 for the integrated segment of the industry; it is 
not surprising that integrated firms, far from adding to capacity, are 
closing plants and disinvesting as quickly as possible.  At the end of 
1985, the most efficient minimill producers, in contrast to their inte- 
grated brethren, had a q of roughly 1.15, providing scope for continued 
investment. 
This analysis  of investment highlights two distinctions within the 
basic industries. First, investment trends imply bleaker prospects for 
American steel than for textiles and automobiles. Second, it is critically 
important to distinguish the prospects of the minimill subsector from 
those of integrated steel. 
5.4.4 Choice of Technology 
Choice of technology can exercise a decisive influence over produc- 
tion costs and international competitiveness. U.S. producers have been 
indicted for failing to adopt cost-minimizing technologies including con- 
tinuous casting in steel and the air-jet loom in textiles. Since this debate 
has tended to center on the choice of technology by the steel industry, 
this section focuses on three recent developments in steel production: 
continuous casting, the basic oxygen furnace (BOF), and the complex 
of technologies comprising the minimill. (Section 5.7 below discusses 
subsequent innovations in steel and the other basic industries.) 
Casting is the  third  of  four main  stages of  primary  steel making: 
smelting, melting, casting, and rolling. Continuous casting permits the 
elimination of costly and time-consuming discontinuities in the casting 
process. In ingot casting, liquid steel is transferred by ladle from the 
converter or furnace to ingot molds which are then trimmed, cooled, 
and solidified, after which the steel is withdrawn from the molds, re- 
heated  in  soaking pits,  and rolled  into slabs, blooms, or billets.  In 
continuous casting, liquid steel is transferred in an even stream first 
into a water-cooled mold and then to a cooling chamber, from which 
it is continuously withdrawn by a system of rollers and upon solidifying 
is cut into pieces of the required length. The advantages of continuous 
casting include yield, which exceeds 95 percent compared to approx- 
imately 80 percent for semifinished products made by rolling ingots in 
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quality, including more consistent chemical composition and fewer sur- 
face defects; energy saving due to the elimination of the energy-intensive 
ingot processes; and increased productivity due to the elimination of 
several labor-intensive stages in the production process (see Associ- 
ation of American Iron and Steel Engineers  1986). 
Following the development of experimental machines in the late 1940s, 
commercial introduction of continuous casting occurred between 1952 
and the early 1960s. Continuous casting was first adopted on a large 
scale in the late 1960s. Figure 5.9 compares the course of adoption in 
the United States and abroad, illustrating the extent to which the United 
States has lagged other countries adopting this technology. Although 
the American industry began to close the gap by constructing or com- 
missioning more than  sixteen continuous casters between  1981  and 
1983, a sizable shortfall remains (Cantor 1985, 2). 
Why has the United States lagged in adopting this innovation? The 
answer has three components: differences in product mix, differences 
in related technologies, and differences in rates of growth and invest- 
ment among national steel industries. Product mix matters because, 
until the 1970s, continuous casters as installed in the United States and 
Western Europe were suitable only for producing smaller sections (bil- 
lets and blooms), which have a square cross section and are therefore 
relatively easy to cast. Slab continuous casting as developed in Japan 
is technologically more sophisticated than billet and bloom continuous 
casting and until the 1970s was not widely utilized.  In the 1960s the 
share of  U.S.  crude steel production technically  suited to billet and 
bloom continuous casting was lower than in a number of European 
countries.30 These differences in product mix are attributable to the 
composition of  end use.  Flat-rolled products (sheets and plates, for 
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example) are made from slabs, whereas beams and rails are made from 
blooms, wire rod and small structurals from billets. The U.S. industry's 
concentration on slabs partly reflects the importance of  the U.S. au- 
tomobile industry in final demand. 
In addition, the cost savings derived from continuous casting depend 
on the type of furnace capacity in place. The diffusion of continuous 
casting was favored by the presence of oxygen converters and retarded 
by the presence of open hearth. As late as 1984, fully 9 percent of U.S. 
crude steel production used the open-hearth furnace, a technology that 
had disappeared in Japan and all but vanished in Europe (calculated 
from American Iron and Steel Institute 1985, table 27). But there must 
be more to the story: Figure 5.10 shows that, while the United States 
in 1984 had both a relatively low share of continuously cast steel and 
a relatively high share of open-hearth capacity, there exists no simple 
relationship between the two variables.31  This is because the rate of 
adoption of continuous casting has also been influenced by the rate of 
expansion of steel industry capacity. Continuous casters are difficult 
to append to existing integrated works whose furnaces and rolling mills 
are not laid out in a manner that permits them to be easily connected 
by a casting machine. Countries that added capacity in the late sixties 
and early  seventies, before the application of continuous casting to 
slabs was perfected, are likely to have a smaller share of current output 
continuously  cast, while  those that expanded  their  capacity  subse- 
quently tend to have a larger share.32 
As our discussion of continuous casting makes clear, the basic ox- 
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tinuous casting, the BOF, by replacing forced hot air with oxygen and 
relying solely on the heat generated by molten ore, eliminated the need 
for external fuel sources and reduced heat times by a factor of 12. Table 
5.11 compares the adoption of basic oxygen furnaces by U.S. producers 
and their principal industrial corn petit or^.^^ The United States lagged 
behind Japan in the adoption of the BOF from the late 1950s and behind 
Europe from the mid-1970s. As in the case of continuous casting, the 
lag reflects  several factors. In the  1950s, when the new technology 
came on line, U.S. steel makers had a large amount of open-hearth 
capacity in place. The cost savings of replacing an open hearth with a 
BOF were less than the savings associated with installing a BOF rather 
than an open hearth for countries committed to capacity expansion. 
Rapidly growing national industries thus were better placed to install 
the new technology. In addition, BOFs could accept a maximum of 30 
percent scrap rather than the 50 percent typical of open hearths; hence 
the relative abundance of  scrap in the United States attenuated their 
advantages. Finally, entrepreneurial inertia cannot be dismissed; early 
BOFs were developed in Europe rather than the United States, and 
American producers were slow to appreciate the advantages of this 
foreign te~hnology.~~ 
As table 5.11 makes clear, some U.S. producers compensated for 
their failure to adopt the BOF by installing electric arc furnaces instead. 
In 1984, the share of electric furnaces in U.S. utilized capacity was 25 
Table 5.11  Adoption of New Furnace Technologies, 1960-84 (shares of total 
crude steel output) 
Nine EEC 
U.S.  Japan  Countries  Canada 
Basic oxygen furnace 
1960  3.1  11.9  1.6  28.1 
1965  17.4  55.0  19.4  32.3 
1970  48.1  79.1  42.9  31.1 
1975  61.6  82.5  63.3  56.1 
1981  60.6  75.2  75.1  58.6 
1984  57.1  72.3  74.2  73.0 
Basic oxygen or 
electric furnace 
1960  11.8  32.0  11.5  40.4 
1965  27.9  75.3  31.5  45.1 
1970  63.5  95.9  57.7  45.9 
1975  81.0  98.9  82.6  76.4 
1981  88.0  100.0  98.6  85.6 
1984  91.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: International Iron and Steel Institute 1985; Sreef Srarisricaf Yearbook, Brussels, 
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percent greater than in the other countries considered. Advantages of 
electric furnaces include small size and hence low capital requirements 
(minimum efficient scale of an electric furnace is 0.8 million tons of 
steel annually compared to 6 million tons for a BOF), ability to use 
100 percent scrap (eliminating the need for coke ovens and blast fur- 
naces and reducing the cost of raw material inputs by up to 50 percent), 
and compatibility with continuous casting. Karlson (1986) explains the 
growth of electric furnace capacity in the United States largely on the 
basis of these factors. 
The electric furnace is a central component of the complex of tech- 
nologies comprising the minimill. Minimills can be constructed for a 
fraction of  the capital cost  of a new integrated mill.  Using electric 
furnaces in conjunction with continuous casters and a rolling mill, they 
initially tended to locate in scrap-abundant regions isolated from in- 
tegrated producers by transport costs. Most minimill firms have not 
been organized by the USWA; they pay lower wages and operate under 
more flexible work rules than their integrated competitors. They have 
concentrated mainly on simple, low-value-added products such as wire 
rod and reinforcing bar that need not be produced to high metallurgical 
standards, leaving to integrated producers the flat-rolled sheet used in 
automobiles  and  appliances.  Many  minimill  firms  are  increasingly 
adapting their methods to the production of high-quality bars and rods, 
however, and are expected to enter the market for sheet products by 
the end of  the decade (Barnett and Schorsch  1983, 85). Since U.S. 
imports tend to be produced by foreign integrated firms (despite the 
growing importance of Japanese and Canadian minimills), the import 
penetration ratio in the market segment relevant to minimills is con- 
siderably lower than for the American steel industry as a whole. The 
same transport costs that provide minimills with natural protection 
from domestic integrated competitors provide protection from imports. 
This market segmentation has begun to break down, however, as mini- 
mill firms have expanded their capacity, moved into product lines tra- 
ditionally dominated by integrated works, and penetrated the home turf 
of integrated firms. 
The financial performance of the minimill firms has been consistently 
superior to that of  their integrated  competitor^.^^ While a number of 
these firms have recently experienced financial difficulties, rendering 
overoptimistic the enthusiasm of some early analysts, as a group they 
continued to outperform their integrated competitors and now account 
for about 16 percent of the U.S. market and 22 percent of  domestic 
shipments. Increasingly it appears that the U.S. industry is bifurcating 
into a relatively healthy minimill subsector and a declining integrated 
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As the example of minimills illustrates, U.S. steel producers remain 
active in adopting new technologies.  At the same time, their record 
illustrates the disadvantages of an early  start: having installed large 
amounts of capacity in the 1940s and 1950s before the new technologies 
were available, those established producers that dominated the inte- 
grated sector were ill placed to adopt subsequent alternatives. 
5.4.5  Energy Prices 
Higher energy prices have had two sets of countervailing effects on 
the competitive position of U.S. basic industries. Insofar as steel and 
vehicles are more energy-intensive than other sectors, higher energy 
costs raise prices and reduce industry employment both at home and 
abroad. At the same time, since the share of energy in total costs is 
greater in the EC and Japan than in the United States, higher energy 
prices tend to strengthen the competitive position of the U.S. indus- 
tries vis-a-vis their foreign  counterpart^.^^ The share of energy in total 
costs has been  relatively  low in  the United  States due to abundant 
domestic energy  supplies and minimal energy taxation.  The impor- 
tance of  these effects  varies greatly  across industries,  however.  At 
one extreme, since textile and apparel manufacturing is far from en- 
ergy-intensive,  any  comparative  advantage  accruing  to  the  United 
States has been minimal.37  At the other extreme, energy costs have a 
major impact on the demand for automobiles and are a major element 
in  steel production. As of  1976, coal, fuel oil, natural gas, and elec- 
tricity accounted for a quarter of major input costs in  the U.S. steel 
industry. Although the impact of changes in energy costs on U.S. steel 
employment  is  theoretically  ambiguous,  Grossman  (1986) estimates 
that  U.S.  steel  industry  employment  would  have  been  thirty-five 
hundred greater in 1976-78  had there been no change in the relative 
price of  energy, and that higher energy  prices  led to the loss of  an 
additional three  thousand jobs between  1979 and  1983.38  Insofar as 
the relative price of energy has fallen subsequently, these effects have 
been working in the other direction. 
5.5  Government Policy and Competitiveness 
Government policies affecting the basic industries are of two types: 
policies explicitly designed to influence output and employment in steel, 
autos, textiles, and apparel (trade policy, adjustment assistance) and 
policies targeted at the economy as a whole but with a special impact 
on  those  industries  (macroeconomic  policy,  pollution  abatement 
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5.5.1  Trade Policy 
U.S. policies governing trade in steel, autos, textiles, and apparel 
differ from trade policy for other industries by virtue of their reliance 
on nontariff measures, notably voluntary export restraints. These forms 
of trade policy tend to be implemented on an incremental basis and to 
have a variety of  unintended  consequences which introduce unusual 
distortions into the pattern of basic industry trade. 
Textiles illustrate those features that distinguish U.S. basic industry 
trade policy from trade policy for other sectors and show how a pre- 
sumption of  protection comes to be built into the policy debate with 
the passage of time. Voluntary export restraints by Japanese producers 
were first negotiated in  1937.39  This agreement established the prece- 
dent of  handling textile trade policy separate from the general trade 
program. In 1955, with Japan’s admission to the GATT, tariffs on her 
exports were cut but replaced less than a year later by VERs (voluntary 
export restraints) and a five-year plan for controlling cotton textile and 
apparel exports to the United States. Thus, nontariff barriers have been 
a feature of U.S.  textile market for fully half a century. Initially, U.S. 
textile trade policy was unique; subsequently, its distinguishing fea- 
tures-long-lived  protection, reliance on voluntary export restraints, 
and industry-specific negotiations-spread  to other basic industries, 
notably automobiles and steel. 
Following an interlude during which textile imports were restricted 
by the Short-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textile Trade (1961  -62) and 
the  subsequent  Long-Term  Arrangement  (1962-73),  the  Multifiber 
Agreement (MFA) was concluded as part of the  1973 GATT negotia- 
tions. The Long-Term Agreement had departed from GATT rules for 
manufactured  goods by  permitting  import restrictions to be applied 
unilaterally,  selectively, and without  compensation to the  exporter. 
Moreover, by restricting imports of  cotton textiles without affecting 
imports of  man-made fibers and apparel, these agreements induced 
developing countries to  shift into the production of  the latter.  This 
provided impetus for the negotiation of a more comprehensive agree- 
ment, the MFA, which initially restricted the growth of textile imports 
from Japan to 5  percent  per  annum and from Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
South Korea, and Malaysia to 7-7.5  percent per annum. Imports from 
new entrants and small suppliers were treated more favorably. Gov- 
ernments were permitted to impose unilateral import controls in  the 
event of market disruption (defined as serious damage to the domestic 
industry) and to negotiate lower rates of import growth for items upon 
which domestic producers were particularly dependent. Quotas were 
established through  the negotiation of  bilateral  agreements covering 
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then, the quota system has been tightened further. In 1986, when Con- 
gress passed a textile quota bill and attempted to override the presi- 
dent’s veto, the United States adopted new agreements with Korea, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong. The first of these, for example, limits import 
growth to 0.8 percent per annum, compared to 8.6 percent from 1981 
to 1984, and extends coverage to silk blends, ramie, and linen, fibers 
into  which foreign producers  have  moved  in  response  to  previous 
restrictions. 
Estimating the effects of textile trade policy is rendered difficult by 
the nontariff nature of the restrictions and the differentiated nature of 
the product (creating problems that arise in attempts to assess auto- 
motive and steel industry trade policy as well).40  Fortunately, for at 
least some foreign products it is possible to estimate tariff equivalents 
indirectly. For the case of Hong Kong, where export quotas are freely 
traded, Hamilton (1986) used data on the unit values of  U.S. textile 
imports and the market value of  quotas to calculate the import tariff 
equivalent of  U.S. quotas. These tariff equivalents, shown in figure 
5.11, are both substantial and variable. 
Nontariff barriers have significantly reduced U.S. imports of textile 
products. The value of U.S. textile and apparel imports (in equivalent 
square yards) grew by only 1.3 percent per annum between 1973 and 
1981, while their composition shifted from textiles to apparel, reflecting 
differential treatment of the two categories under the MFA. Over the 
1970s, the apparel share of U.S. textile and apparel imports rose from 
35 percent to 58 percent. Insofar as the U.S. possesses a comparative 
advantage in the production of highly tailored, high-value-added mer- 
chandise rather than unfinished cloth, this side effect of quotas has 
functioned to the disadvantage of the domestic industry. 
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Fig. 5.11  Rate of import tariff equivalent on U.S. textile imports from 
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Since 1981, import growth has accelerated to 15 percent per annum. 
How could this occur under the provisions of the MFA? First, a newly 
negotiated bilateral agreement with the Peoples Republic of China per- 
mitted quota growth of 10 percent per annum. Second, the NICs moved 
into those few remaining categories not under quota. Third, production 
shifted to countries such as Sri Lanka and Mauritius for which quotas 
did not exist. Fourth, merchandise may have been transshipped through 
third countries for which quotas were not binding. The incentive to 
respond in these ways was undoubtedly  heightened  by  the dollar’s 
sharp appreciation, which enhanced the profitability of  exporting to 
the U.S. market. The American response was predictable. Firms lob- 
bied for a tightening of  import restrictions and, starting in December 
1983, the administration moved to establish three hundred new textile 
quotas and to prevent their circumvention by transshipping. The rate 
of growth of textile imports fell to less than 7 percent in 1985. In effect, 
it appears that the rate of growth of U.S. imports is given exogenously 
by policy in the long run, despite various forms of slippage which offer 
scope for a positive price elasticity  of  supply over short periods  of 
time. 
Calculations  by  Hufbauer,  Berliner,  and  Elliott  (1986) imply that 
restraints depressed U.S.  textile and apparel imports by approximately 
28  percent  in  1981. While offering widely differing estimates of  the 
effect of  imports  on output and  employment,  studies of  the textile 
industry uniformly conclude that output and employment effects are 
likely to be smaller than changes in import volumes. Quotas increase 
domestic production by less than they reduce imports because they 
raise domestic prices, reducing market demand. The percentage change 
in domestic textile industry employment should be roughly equal to 
the  change in  domestic production (Pelzman and Martin  1980, 16). 
Using assumptions such as these, Hufbauer, Berliner, and Elliott (1986) 
calculate that protection permitted the retention in 1981 of 150,000  jobs 
in textiles and 390,000 in apparel, increasing the total by 26 percent. 
Given the inelasticity  of  consumer demand for textiles  and apparel, 
domestic consumers paid a high price per job, on the order of $37,000 
1981 dollars. 
The American steel industry is another long-time recipient of pro- 
tection, the sector’s early growth having been greatly  stimulated by 
shelter from  British  competition. U.S. steel trade  policy  takes two 
forms-one traditional, one uniquely modern. The traditional form is 
antidumping law, which protects domestic producers against sales be- 
low cost and price discrimination by foreign competitors. Both prac- 
tices are prevalent in the steel industry, since their capital intensity 
compels foreign firms to sell below average cost during cyclical down- 
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prices below those prevailing in their home markets. The United States 
has had statutes to deter predatory pricing in international trade for 
more than sixty  years.  Since  1974, antidumping investigations have 
focused on the “constructed value” criterion for dumping, according 
to which the United States estimates foreign material and fabrication 
costs and levies an antidumping duty if import prices fall short of those 
costs plus fixed margins for general expenses and profits. This con- 
structed value criterion provided considerable incentive for U.S. pro- 
ducers to file antidumping suits, which soon exceeded the government’s 
capacity to process them. This led in 1977 to the trigger price mech- 
anism (TPM), under which the government monitored  steel imports 
and, upon finding that steel was imported at a price below reference 
prices based on the constructed value of Japanese steel, automatically 
triggered a Treasury investigation. The TPM operated only so long as 
the industry refrained from filing antidumping suits. The advantages of 
this mechanism, from an administrative viewpoint, were that it not 
only eliminated the burden of antidumping suits but provided the au- 
thorities some insulation from industry pressure. But the TPM con- 
tained many special features and unintended effects, some of  which 
worked to the U.S. industry’s advantage, others which worked against 
it (for details, see Eichengreen and van der Ven  1984). Ultimately, the 
industry, concluding that the latter dominated, filed antidumping suits 
that led to the TPM’s suspension and in 1982 to its demise. 
The second, uniquely modern form that U.S. steel trade policy takes 
is VERs, like those in  textile trade.  VERs were negotiated with the 
Japanese and European steel industries in 1968, implemented in 1969, 
and renewed in 1972. Following the first oil shock and the steel market 
slump, the United  States imposed a series of increasingly  stringent 
trade restrictions, including new VERs and antidumping investigations 
culminating in the TPM. VERs on steel like VERs on textiles were a 
mixed blessing. As in textiles, foreign suppliers responded by trading 
up, shifting to higher-value products in which the United States might 
normally be thought to have a comparative advantage. As in textiles, 
sales by nonsignatory countries tended to replace restrained imports, 
and there were reports of shipments diverted through third countries. 
Once VERs were replaced by the TPM, a “somewhat  porous price 
floor” (Barnett and Schorsch 1983, 240) for steel products was estab- 
lished, and the import share of the U.S. market stabilized in the neigh- 
borhood of  15 percent.41  That the TPM’s coverage was not limited tg 
foreign producers that were party to explicit agreements was a major 
advantage from the U.S. industry’s point of view. 
Since the TPM’s collapse in  1982, U.S.  steel trade has again been 
governed by VERs.  These differ from early agreements by defining 
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designed to limit import penetration to 20.5 percent of the steel market. 
European producers agreed to restrain their U.S. sales to shares of 
U.S. apparent consumption ranging from 2.2 percent for tin plate to 
21.85 percent for sheet piling. Additional VERs were negotiated with 
Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa, and by the end of I985 the number 
of  VERs had  increased to fifteen, covering 80 percent  of  the  U.S. 
market.  Quotas are administered  by  the exporting countries  via li- 
censing systems. As a quid pro quo for these agreements, the U.S. 
industry has refrained from filing antidumping suits against participat- 
ing countries. 
These VERs have not prevented imports from capturing a rising share 
of the U.S. market since 1981. Their coverage is incomplete (Canada 
as well as Argentina and Taiwan are excluded), and they can be cir- 
cumvented by many of the devices utilized by  textile producers.  At 
the same time, their impact  is  reflected  in  the fact  that the import 
penetration ratio fell from 26.2 percent to 20.5 percent the month fol- 
lowing the conclusion of  the mid-1985 VERs. One can get a sense of 
the stringency  of  these agreements by  noting that the red  cast-iron 
telephone booths sold off by British Telecom as souveniers have been 
counted against the European steel quota. 
Since steel products are heterogeneous and import restrictions take 
nonprice forms, measuring their impact is not  straightforward. The 
percentage premium of  spot export prices over the U.S. user price is 
probably the best measure of the tariff equivalent of VERs and coun- 
tervailing  As shown in figure 5.12, except during the 1973-74 
commodity boom, when imports subsided and U.S. exports rose, U.S. 
user prices have consistently remained  above foreign export prices. 
Fig. 5.12  Percentage  premium  of  spot export prices over U.S. user 
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The differential hovered in the range of  15 percent to 30 percent over 
the second half of the 1970s and subsequently grew to nearly 40 percent, 
confirming the increasing stringency of  U.S. import restraints. Mea- 
sured as tariff equivalents, levels of protection received by the industry 
are substantial. 
Tsao (1985) estimates for 1983-84 that VERs reduced U.S. imports 
from the EC by  17 percent and total U.S. imports by  15 percent.  A 
Department of Commerce study estimates that net imports caused a 
loss of  148,000 jobs in steel in 1984; together with Tsao’s estimate of 
the change in imports (and assuming no change in exports), this implies 
that U.S. import restrictions increased steel industry employment by 
22,000 workers, or by  15 percent.43  Grossman’s (1986) estimates, in 
contrast, are predicated upon an elasticity of production employment 
with respect to import prices of  approximately unity. Attributing the 
entire divergence of U.S. user prices from European spot export prices 
to the effects of  VERs implies that U.S. trade restrictions, by raising 
effective import prices 30 percent, increased production employment 
by the same per~entage.~~  This higher figure should be regarded as an 
upper bound, since other variables affecting employment, notably steel- 
workers’ wages, would have adjusted to the change in import prices 
caused by the elimination of VERs ;  allowing wages to change by the 
same percentage  as import prices  halves  the  change in  production 
employment, again resulting in an estimate of  15 percent. Still other 
estimates of  the change in production employment are slightly Iower 
(Hufbauer, Berliner, and Elliott 1986; Cantor 1984). 
U.S. automotive trade policy takes the same form-voluntary  re- 
straints-as  policy toward textiles and steel. Explicit VERs for auto- 
motive trade are a relatively recent innovation for which textile and 
steel policies provided  inspiration. Until the mid-l970s, the growing 
U.S. market share of Japan was perceived as coming mostly at the 
expense of Germany and the United Kingdom. As late as 1970, Japan 
accounted for less than  20  percent  of  total U.S. imports (see table 
5.12). But once the first oil price shock shifted demand toward smaller, 
more fuel efficient cars, Japanese producers were well situated to ex- 
pand their exports. By  1979, Japan accounted for more than half of 
total U.S. imports and for 15 percent of  the domestic market. In re- 
sponse to industry complaints, the United  States then negotiated  a 
voluntary restraint agreement under which the Japanese agreed to re- 
duce car exports in the year beginning April 1, 1981, by 7.7 percent. 
Japanese exports were held to the same level for two subsequent years, 
after which the ceiling was raised by 10 percent. In 1985 MITI declined 
to renew the VERs in light of the record earnings of U.S. automakers, 
although the Japanese continue to restrain their exports to the United 
States using traditional forms of administrative guidance. Table 5.12  U.S. Imports of Passenger Cars by Country of Origin, 1%5-85  (as percentage of  U.S. imports) 
West  United 
Year  Belgium  Canada  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  Sweden  Kingdom  Others 
1984  0.2  22.0  5.5  8.2  0.2  55.1  2.4  0.6  5.9. 
1983  0.1  22.8  5.8  9.0  0.1  57.6  3.0  1.5  0.1 
1982  0.1  22.9  2.9  11.0  0.3  59.4  2.5  0.4  0.1 
1981  0.1  18.8  1.4  12.6  0.7  63.7  2.3  0.4  0.1 
1980  0.1  18.3  1.5  14.5  1.4  61.3  1.9  1 .o  0.1 
1979  0.1  22.5  0.9  16.4  2.4  53.8  2.2  1.6  0.1 
1975  1.8  35.4  0.8  17.8  4.9  33.5  2.5  3.2  0.1 
1970  2.5  34.4  1.8  33.5  2.1  18.9  2.9  3.8  0.1 
1965  0.1  5.2  4.5  67.3  I .7  4.6  4.6  11.9  0.1 
Source: Calculated from Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, MVMA Facrs and Figures, 1985. 
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. 
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As in steel and textiles, auto industry VERs gave rise to a variety 
of distortions. They provided Japanese producers an incentive to shift 
into  jeeps and light trucks not covered by the initial agreement (although 
this loophole was closed subsequently). They encouraged the export 
of components, leading Congress to consider domestic-content legis- 
lation. They provided nations not covered by the agreement, notably 
those of Europe, with an incentive to increase shipments to the United 
States and encouraged entry by other foreign producers, notably Korea 
and Yugoslavia. They led to direct investment by Japanese producers 
in the United States (see section 5.7 below). They provided an incentive 
for trading up, as Japanese producers  shifted into the sale of  more 
luxurious vehicles. 
The effects of quota agreements are difficult to estimate because of 
the extent of trading up. Feenstra (1984) has estimated that two-thirds 
of the postagreement rise in Japanese car prices reflected quality change, 
yielding an estimate of  the increase in quality-adjusted import prices 
in 1981-82  much smaller than those of  other auth01-s.~~  He estimates 
that the reduction in import volumes and rise in import prices increased 
domestic  production by  8-9  percent  in  the first year of  VERs  and 
increased production employment by somewhat less (because of the 
existence of excess capacity). However, Feenstra’s estimates for 1981 - 
82, a period when U.S. auto demand remained relatively depressed, 
may understate the impact that fixed import quotas have had in sub- 
sequent years as the domestic market has expanded. Comparisons of 
the prices  of a Toyota Corolla or a Nissan Sentra in Japan and the 
United  States (e.g., Crandall  1986) show that American consumers, 
who had paid $500 more than Japanese consumers in 1979-80  before 
the imposition of VERs, paid $3,000 more in 1985. Assuming that the 
initial $500 reflects transportation and preparation, this suggests a tariff 
equivalent in excess of 25 percent (assuming an $8,000 U.S. sales price). 
As domestic demand has grown and quotas have become more binding, 
their domestic price and output effects appear to have increased. Auto 
import restraints are defined as absolute levels, in  contrast  to steel 
import restraints which are denominated as market shares. One would 
expect the former to grow more stringent over time. On the other hand, 
as new countries have entered the U.S. market-partly  in response to 
Japanese  VERs-the  effects  of  these  restraints  may  have  been 
attenuated. 
5.5.2  U.S. Industrial Policies 
U.S. industrial policies fall into three categories: export promotion 
programs, investment subsidies for modernization, and import protec- 
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policymakers tend to concentrate on export promotion schemes; the 
less competitive, the more they tend to concentrate on import protec- 
tion. Not  surprisingly, the predominant form  of  assistance for U.S. 
basic industries has been import protection. Policy toward the steel 
industry, for example, has been almost exclusively of this form. 
Policy toward the textile industry has been more diverse. The Com- 
merce Department has lobbied for the removal of foreign barriers to 
U.S.  textile exports. For nearly two decades it has assisted U.S.  textile 
and apparel producers wishing to develop export sales by helping them 
locate foreign sales agents, holding exhibitions, and organizing semi- 
nars on export marketing. While the U.S. industry has developed  a 
few successful exports, notably blue jeans, it has essentially remained 
an import-competing rather than an exporting sector; in consequence, 
industrywide trends in output, employment, and profitability have been 
little affected by Commerce Department activities (Arpan et al. 1982, 
263-64).  In  addition, the industry has received federal low-interest 
loans through the Public Works and Economic Development Act (EDA) 
of  1965, the Trade Acts of  1962 and  1974, and  the  Small Business 
Administration Program. Each of these schemes made funds available 
to firms unable to secure them through normal channels, so long as 
there  was a reasonable expectation of  repayment and the proceeds 
were used for expansion or modernization of capacity. In practice, the 
textile and apparel industries have not been major recipients of funds 
from these programs. 
Although U.S. policy toward the automobile industry is dominated 
by import restraints, financial subsidies have also been important, no- 
tably in  the case of  Chrysler. Assistance to Chrysler starting in  1979 
took the form of government loan guarantees, which subsidized bor- 
rowing by  a firm for which the cost of  credit would otherwise have 
been prohibitive due to bankruptcy risk. The availability of funds for 
modernization, in conjunction with the upturn in the U.S. auto market 
and the imposition of VERs upon Japan, permitted Chrysler to repay 
its government-guaranteed loans. That the loans were repaid does not 
change the fact that the government guarantee was a subsidy to the 
firm. 
Besides protection, the most important form of  U.S. policy toward 
the basic industries has been adjustment assistance. Adjustment assis- 
tance is designed to provide retraining, education, and transitional in- 
come for the newly unemployed. In practice, income transfers have 
been much more important than training schemes. According to Arpan 
et  al.  (19821,  approximately  95  percent  of  adjustment  assistance  to 
former apparel-industry workers have gone into allowances to replace 
lost earnings rather than retraining or education. The number of work- 
ers that have been placed by the employment service remains negligible. 329  International Competition in the Products of U.S. Basic Industries 
5.5.3 
Until recently, economists would have found it difficult to convince 
laymen  that  monetary and fiscal policies rather than  sector-specific 
events had exercised a decisive impact on the basic industries. How- 
ever, the dramatic post-1981 real  appreciation of  the  dollar and its 
relationship to the monetary-fiscal mix have heightened awareness of 
the importance of macroeconomic factors (see the discussion in Bran- 
son  1986). In  addition, the  severity  of  the post-1979 recession  has 
reminded observers of the sensitivity of the steel and automobile in- 
dustries, as producers of durable goods and of inputs into their man- 
ufacture, to macroeconomic conditions (see section 5.3 above). 
The budget deficits of the 198Os, combined with a tight anti-inflationary 
monetary policy, drove up the  relative  price of  domestic goods by 
causing a rapid real appreciation of  the dollar. The dollar’s strength 
was a corollary of the capital inflow needed to absorb the debt issued 
to finance the deficit, and was reinforced by greater aggregate demand 
at home than abroad, which required for product market equilibrium 
that demand be shifted away from domestic goods (see Frankel, chap. 
9, this volume). This real appreciation of the dollar impacted the basic 
industries because production costs in those industries are affected by 
economywide conditions and are imperfectly flexible in own-currency 
terms. For example, the 58 percent rise in the multilateral trade-weighted 
value of the dollar between  1980 and  1984 dramatically reduced the 
dollar value of the wages paid by foreign steel, textile, and automobile 
producers.  Table 5.13 shows the dramatic decline in German hourly 
earnings in manufacturing expressed in U.S. dollars and the smaller 
but nonetheless significant decline in Japanese dollar-denominated la- 
bor costs over the period 1980:2- 1985:  1, when the value of the dollar 
rose by more than 80 percent against the deutsche mark and rose by 
nearly 20 percent against the yen. The rise in dollar-denominated for- 
eign labor costs during the subsequent period of dollar depreciation is 
equally dramatic, although the relationship between the yen and the 
deutsche mark is reversed: whereas the fall in the nominal yen-dollar 
rate is nearly twice as fast the second period as its rise in the first, the 
fall in the deutsche mark-dollar  rate is less than half as rapid in the 
second period as its rise in the first. 
Nontariff barriers tend to reduce the price sensitivity of U.S. imports 
of basic industry products and hence to limit the impact of real exchange 
rates on employment in import-competing sectors. In addition, changes 
over time in  the height  of  these nontariff barriers  render the price 
elasticity  of production employment  extremely difficult to estimate. 
Estimates in the appendix (table 5.A.1) suggest that this elasticity ranges 
from roughly  -0.2 in textiles and apparel to -0.5  in automobiles and 
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Table 5.U  Changes in Labor Costs in Manufacturing in Periods of  Fluctuating 
Exchange Rates (in percentage points) 































Source: For U.S.:  Department of  Labor, Bureau  of  Labor Statistics, Monrhly Lubor 
Review, various issues. For Germany  and Japan: OECD, Main Economic Indicators, 
various issues. 
"Average hourly earnings of nonagricultural production  or nonsupervisory  workers, in 
current dollars. 
bHourly earnings in enterprises employing more than ten persons. 
CAverage  monthly earnings. 
steel. According to these estimates, the real appreciation of the dollar 
between the second half of  the 1970s and the first half  of the 1980s 
reduced employment in textiles and apparel by nearly 4 percent and 
employment in motor vehicles and steel by nearly  10 percent (table 
5.A.2). The greater impact of exchange rate changes on autos and steel 
than on textiles and apparel makes sense when one observes that the 
dollar has fluctuated most dramatically (especially since the beginning 
of  1985) not against the currencies of developing countries, which are 
the principal suppliers of textile exports to the U.S.  market, but against 
the  currencies  of  industrial  countries  such as Germany and Japan, 
which are the main suppliers of  autos and steel. 
5.5.4  Pollution Abatement Expenditures 
Unlike industry spokesmen, who attach great weight to the impact 
on international competitiveness of  U.  S. pollution abatement expen- 
ditures, academic analyses have generally concluded that the effects 
of  these costs have been  small. Table 5.14  shows pollution  control 
expenditures as shares of GNP and investment for 1975, when concern 
over improving environmental quality was at its height. U.S.  expendi- 
ture shares exceed those of its industrial competitors, with the notable 
exception of Japan. Table 5.15 presents  three estimates of  environ- 331  International Competition in the Products of  U.S. Basic Industries 
Table 5.14  Private Sector Investment in Pollution Control, 1975 
Percent 


































Source: Kalt 1985. 
Table 5.15  Direct and Indirect Regulatory Costs and Trade Performance 
Direct 
and 
Direct  Indirect  All 
Environmental  Environmental  Regulatory  Net 
Costs*  Costsb  Costsb  ExportsC 
Textiles  0.21  1.34  2.66  -0.68 
Apparel  0.03  0.66  1.48  -  12.39 
Iron and steel  1.28  2.38  5.36  -8.70 
Motor vehicles 
Average of 3  I 
and equipment  0.14  0.99  6.15  -6.19 
import-competing 
industriesd  0.58  1.54  3.96  -7.64 
Source: Kalt  1985 and author’s calculations. 
aCents per dollar of industry output. 
bCents per dollar of  final demand. 
CNet  exports as percent of  value of  shipments. 
dWeighted by value of total industry output. 
mental expenditure as shares of  industry output or final demand for 
the U.S. basic industries and import-competing industry as a whole. 
Direct costs of environmental regulation include the capital, operating, 
and administrative costs of  pollution abatement.  Direct and indirect 
costs include in addition the expenditures of other sectors which pro- 
duce inputs into the industries in question. Direct and indirect costs 
of all regulation add estimates of  the costs of health, safety, and eco- 
nomic regulation (including price and entry restrictions). 332  Barry EichengreenlCharles W.  Parry/Philip Caldwell 
The steel industry stands out for its disproportionate direct costs. 
The only  other industries with  comparable burdens  are nonferrous 
metal  mining, paper  products,  nonagricultural  mechanicals, electric 
power generation, and the government sector (Kalt  1985, 9). In con- 
trast, the direct environmental quality expenditures of the textile, ap- 
parel, and automotive industries are well below the U.S. average. When 
both direct and indirect costs are considered, costs to the steel industry 
remain above average, but to a lesser extent. Once other regulatory 
(notably mileage and carbon-dioxide-related) costs are added, vehicles 
join steel with regulatory burdens in excess of the U.S.  average. Clearly, 
regulatory costs have affected steel and automobiles very differently 
than textiles and apparel. 
Figure  5.13 takes a closer look at  the direct pollution abatement 
expenditures of the U.S.  and Japanese steel ind~stries.~~  Japanese ex- 
penditures per ton of  steel output peaked in 1976. (The year 1976 also 
marked the peak of Japanese environmental control expenditures as a 
share of  total investment, at 21  percent.) Japanese expenditures fell 
thereafter, although they turned up in the early 1980s when more strin- 
gent water pollution, dust, and soot regulations were imposed.  U.S. 
expenditures also rose in the early 1970s, but from a lower level, and 
remained stable at a higher plateau into the 1980s. Although the time 
profile of expenditure differed across countries, there is little evidence 
that the U.S. industry bore a heavier burden overall. 
At the same time, expenditures by both the U.S. and Japanese steel 
industries have vastly exceeded those of semi-industrialized countries 
where the pressure to improve environmental quality generally is less 
intense, placing both industries at something of a disadvantage relative 
to competitors in lower-income countries.47  Looking across industries, 
Fig. 5.13  Pollution  control expenditures per thousand tons of  crude 
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Kalt (1985) finds that higher environmental costs have led to a signif- 
icant deterioration in U.S. trade performance. As incomes in devel- 
oping countries continue to rise and their demands for environmental 
protection grow, any U.S. disadvantage due to environmental regula- 
tion can be expected to decline.  But this is likely to be a source of 
little relief in the decades immediately ahead. 
5.6  Wider Impact on the U.S. Economy 
Import penetration and declining basic industry employment have 
wider implications for the American economy. Of  the various effects 
that might be considered, this section focuses on three: implications 
for the current account of  the balance of  payments, implications for 
the income distribution, and implications for the regional location of 
industrial activity. 
On the surface, the basic industries appear to have contributed sig- 
nificantly to the U.S.  merchandise trade deficit. Steel imports are least 
important in the aggregate: in 1984, U.S. steel imports were only three 
percent of total merchandise imports, and the deficit on trade in steel 
was only 8 percent of the total merchandise deficit. The figures for 
textiles and apparel are larger: textile and apparel imports were 5.8 
percent of total U.S.  merchandise imports, while the textile and apparel 
deficit was  14.1 percent of the overall merchandise trade deficit. The 
most important basic industry deficit was that in motor vehicle trade: 
passenger cars accounted for 9.1 percent  of  U.S. imports  and 22.4 
percent of  the deficit. Thus, together these four basic industries ac- 
counted for 44.5 percent of the merchandise trade deficit. 
It does not follow that trends in the basic industries are a cause of 
the current account deficit in  any meaningful economic sense. The 
current account is a macroeconomic variable determined by relation- 
ships among other macroeconomic variables, notably by any imbalance 
between savings and investment. Thus, the current account deficit re- 
sults ultimately from those macroeconomic policies influencing aggre- 
gate savings and investment behavior. Developments affecting partic- 
ular industries determine only the composition of the current account, 
not its level. Trends in the basic industries influence the current account 
only insofar as their prospects  affect  the  economywide investment 
climate or their performance affects economywide levels of employ- 
ment and profitability sufficiently to alter the aggregate level of savings. 
Observers of the American economy have expressed concern that 
the real incomes of wage earners have failed to rise at historical rates 
or to keep pace with the cost of living. As figure 5.7 indicates, the 
declining shares of  steel and motor vehicles  in  total manufacturing 
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turing employment to lower-paid jobs. The elimination of “quality jobs,” 
it is suggested, lowers blue-collar earnings and reduces labor’s share 
of national income. 
Were imports of  steel and motor vehicles suddenly eliminated, em- 
ployment in these industries could be considerably expanded even if 
the  wage premiums  enjoyed  by  steel- and  autoworkers  were main- 
tained. But whether average blue-collar earnings and labor’s share of 
the GNP rose or fell would depend on who financed the redistribution. 
The standard economic argument is that those factors of  production 
used most intensively by the protected industries would benefit, while 
factors used intensively by other sectors would pay for the redistri- 
bution.  That  steel  and  motor  vehicle  production  is  highly  capital- 
intensive compared to the economy as a whole suggests that protection 
for steel and automobiles would raise the demand for capital more than 
demand for labor. Shareholders would be the principal beneficiaries of 
protection for the  steel and vehicle industries.  While workers  with 
industry-specific skills would benefit in the short run, in the long run 
artificial stimulus for these industries is likely to reduce-not  increase- 
labor’s share of national income. 
The relative decline of  the U.S. basic industries has major implica- 
tions for the regional distribution of manufacturing employment. Tables 
5.16-5.19  show how employment in apparel, textiles, steel, and ve- 
hicles has been concentrated  regionally and how that concentration 
has shifted over time. Apparel industry employment, for example, al- 
ready concentrated at the beginning of the 1970s in the Middle Atlantic 
Table 5.16  Apparel and Other Textile Products (SIC 23): Number of 




1970  1977  1984 
Emp.  Est.  Emp.  Est.  Emp.  Est. 
1.  Pacific 
2. Mountain 
3. West N. Central 
4. West S. Central 
5. East S.  Central 
6. East N. Central 
7. New England 
8. Middle Atlantic 










6.5  9.0 
1.1  1.5 
3.4  3.7 
4.1  9.0 
4.1  14.2 
6.6  6.5 
6.6  4.9 
65.7  29.4 
2.1  21.8 
17.9  10.7 
1.9  1.2 
3.3  3.3 
5.3  7.5 
4.8  15.8 
6.1  5.5 
5.  I  5.0 
46.1  26.4 










Source: Calculated from County Business Patterns, various issues. 
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Table 5.17  Textile Mill Products (SIC 22): Number of Employees and Number 
of Establishments (percentages in U.S. totals) 
U.S. Total 
Region 
~~  ~ 
1970  1977  1984 
Emp.  Est.  Emp.  Est.  Emp.  Est. 
1.  Pacific 
2.  Mountain 
3.  West N. Central 
4.  West S. Central 
5.  East S. Central 
6.  East N. Central 
7.  New England 
8. Middle Atlantic 



















2.1  6.0 
0.3  0.6 
0.5  0.8 
1.9  2.3 
10.0  5.7 
2.1  4.2 
7.6  10.3 
12.3  31.3 


















39.4  - 
Source: Calculated from County Business  Patterns, various issues. 
Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
aIdaho and New Mexico not available. 
region, has tended to shift south and westward (see table 5.16). In large 
part this reflects the attractions of low-wage labor in regions where 
unionization rates are low. Trends in textiles (table 5.17) resemble those 
in apparel. Textile industry employment is concentrated in six South 
Atlantic states, with North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia alone 
accounting for more than half of total industry employment. This geo- 
graphical concentration has continued to increase over time. 
Steel industry employment  has been  concentrated traditionally  in 
western Pennsylvania, the vicinity of the Great Lakes, and to a lesser 
extent, California. Compared to the coasts, the Midwest retains a small 
margin of natural protection due to the transport costs of shipping steel 
from Europe or Japan.48  Table 5.18 again reflects a tendency for in- 
dustry to migrate toward the low-wage, nonunionized  South, where 
the growth of minimills has been particularly rapid. The mid-Atlantic 
has been particularly hard hit by the decline in steel industry employ- 
ment. 
Motor vehicle industry employment is concentrated, of  course, in 
the East North Central (table 5.19). But in this industry also, employ- 
ment has tended to migrate toward the East South Central and South 
Atlantic regions. 
A decline in basic  industry  employment need  not  imply either a 
persistent unemployment problem or the disappearance of manufac- 
turing jobs. A dramatic counterexample is provided by Massachusetts, 
where a transition from dependence on the textile industry to sectors Table 5.18  Blast Furnace and Basic Steel Products (SIC 331): Number of 




1970  1977  1984 
Emp.  Est.  Emp.  Est.  Emp.  Est. 
1. Pacific 
2.  Mountain 
3.  West N. Central 
4.  West S. Central 
5. East S. Central 
6. East N. Central 
7.  New England 
8. Middle Atlantic 
9.  South Atlantic 
4.1  10.2  4.1  11.3  3.0  9.8 
0.W  0.5  2. I  1.5  2.5  1.8 
1.7b  3.6  1.8  4.3  2.3  3.6 
2.w  5.4  3.1  8.0  4.6  8.2 
6.0  6.8  5.5  6.3  4.8  15.7 
42.4  32.7  41.6  30.7  45.0  27.9 
lSd  6.6  1.7  6.9  1.7  6.9 
34.0e  27.1  31.4  21.5  25.9  17.5 
8.3f  7.2  8.8  9.5  10.2  8.5 
Source: Calculated from County Business Patterns, various issues. 
Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
aNevada, Utah, Colorado n.a. 
bIowa n.a. 
COklahoma  n.a. 
dRhode Island, New Hampshire n.a. 
eNew Jersey n.a. 
’Delaware n.a. 
Table 5.19  Motor Vehicles and Equipment (SIC 371): Number of  Employees 
and Number of Establishments (percentages of  U.S. totals) 
U.S. Total 
1970  1977  1984 
Region  Emp.  Est.  Emp.  Est.  Emp.  Est. 
1.  Pacific 
2.  Mountain 
3.  West N. Central 
4.  West S. Central 
5.  East S. Central 
6.  East N. Central 
7.  New England 
8. Middle Atlantic 
9.  South Atlantic 
5.3  18.4  6.2  19.2  I .5 
0.2  1.9  0.5  3.9  1.3 
6.9  9.4  7.2  8.3  10.7 
2.0  8.3  2.6  9.6  7.1 
2.6”  4.7  4.3  5.3  9.0 
68.5  34.4  63.4  29.6  46.1 
1.7  3.7  1.4  3.1  2.3 
8.0b  10.2  8.2  11.5  11.4 










Source: Calculated from County Business Patrerns, various issues. 
Nore: Percentages may not sum to  100 due to rounding. 
“Mississippi n.a. 
bNew  Jersey n.a. 
=Delaware n.a. 337  International Competition in the Products of  U.S. Basic Industries 
based on new technologies has been successfully completed (for de- 
tails, see Ferguson and Ladd 1986). Yet this experience does not pro- 
vide a case for untempered optimism. Massachusetts  suffered from 
unemployment in excess of the national average for an extended period 
prior to its post-1975 recovery; thus, its experience does not suggest 
that adjustment will be either quick or painless. Second, the reduction 
in Massachusetts unemployment resulted not from exceptional rates 
of  job creation but from below average population  and labor force 
growth. Unemployment fell because Massachusetts was no less suc- 
cessful than the rest of  the country in creating new jobs (a significant 
achievement itself) and because the commonwealth’s depressed econ- 
omy discouraged in-migration. Third, Massachusetts has singular ad- 
vantages that enable it to exploit the opportunities offered by high-tech 
industries, notably a large educational complex. Whether other states 
can  complete their  transition with the  same  success remains to be 
determined. But by demonstrating the role of an educational infrastruc- 
ture in facilitating the transfer of resources, the Massachusetts example 
may contain lessons for the design of public policy toward the regional 
problem. 
5.7  Response of  the Industries 
Two avenues for enhancing competitiveness-reducing  input costs 
and obtaining additional protection-have  already been addressed. This 
section considers three additional means to this end: the development 
of  new products  and  processes, investment in  the  U.S. by  foreign 
companies, and diversification. 
5.7.1  New Products and Processes 
Criticism of U.S.  basic industries for lagging their foreign competitors 
in the adoption of new technologies should not be allowed to obscure 
the technological dynamism of many firms. For the basic industries, 
advances in manufacturing methods offer more promise than the de- 
velopment of new products. The speed of process innovation will de- 
pend on the success with which basic industries apply new technologies 
developed in the high-tech sector. Much progress has already taken 
place. In the steel industry, automation and computer control of con- 
tinuous caster operations enhance control of caster speed, liquid levels, 
and cooling rates while reducing labor requirements.  Computers are 
increasingly used to regulate fuel consumption in rolling processes and 
to control the quality of feed input in blast furnaces. 
Even in  an industry whose output is apparently as homogenous as 
steel, there is scope for product innovation.  Ladle-refining systems, 
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widely adopted  in recent  years.  Five electrolytic galvanizing lines, 
recently  completed or currently  under  construction,  promise  to in- 
crease by 500 percent the industry’s capacity to supply the automotive 
industry with corrosion resistant, uniformly formable electrogalvan- 
ized steel. Lasers are used to refine the magnetic domain structure of 
electrical steel for transformers, improving product quality and per- 
mitting a price premium to be charged (see Leonard and Collins 1986; 
Neiheisel  1986). 
Process innovation in the automotive industry is proceeding apace.49 
Microprocessor-controlled  flexible machining centers capable of fab- 
ricating parts for power-steering pumps and alternators have recently 
been introduced. These machines can change tools without operator 
assistance as needed for new jobs. Assembling the parts produced by 
such machines  into completed components is a more  delicate task; 
machines with these capabilities remain at the prototype stage, although 
robotics have been applied to stamping and to engine, body, and final 
assembly (Altshuler et al. 1984, 96-97).  Computer numerical control 
has been introduced into engine and transmission machining. Computer- 
aided design has reduced design costs and lead times, while computer- 
aided engineering has reduced the cost of skilled tool-room labor. Com- 
puter  modeling  of  production  flows  has  reduced  inventory  costs, 
enhanced stock control, and helped automate product inspection. 
As with steel, the scope for product innovation in the motor vehicle 
industry is  less extensive  than  in  many  other sectors.  Rather  than 
fundamental changes in the nature of vehicles, it principally takes the 
form of incremental innovations that enhance their capabilities. For 
example, on-board computers are increasingly used to monitor engine 
performance. Electronic traction and skid control can be used to en- 
hance operator control. While the cumulative impact of these improve- 
ments can be substantial, it remains unlikely, as Altshuler et al. (1984) 
conclude, that in the foreseeable future product innovation will radi- 
cally transform the automobile. 
In the textile and apparel industries, technological progress has been 
less rapid. Nonetheless, at the grading stage, new computer methods 
are available for selecting the best combination of fibers for a given 
end use and for eliminating the blend variations associated with hand 
feeding. At  the spinning and weaving stages, technological progress 
has already led to refinements of existing technology. At the assembly 
stage, modest technological advances, such as the automated pocket- 
maker, have been adopted by many firms. The cost of these new tech- 
nologies is prohibitive for all but the largest producers. This will be 
even more the case once research currently underway in Japan and 
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on  robot  technology  like  that  already  in  place  in  the  automobile 
industry.50 
What relief from import competition does innovation offer the U.S. 
basic industries? Although process innovations will remain a critical 
determinant of comparative production costs, it is unlikely that their 
adoption will eliminate the gap between production costs in the United 
States and in its industrial competitors, notably Japan. New technol- 
ogies applicable to the basic industries diffuse rapidly among industrial 
countries; there is no reason to anticipate that the United States will 
be  able to appropriate  such technologies  and  sustain a competitive 
advantage by adopting them to a greater extent than other industrial 
countries. Insofar as new manufacturing methods entail the substitution 
of capital for labor, new technologies that increase the scope for sub- 
stitution may reduce the disadvantage of U.S. basic industries vis-a- 
vis their LDC competitors. But as the NICs continue to develop and 
their labor costs rise in the manner of Japan’s, the importance of such 
savings will shrink. 
Competitive advantages due to product innovation derive from pro- 
ducers’ ability to tailor new products to the tastes and requirements 
of  consumers.  The proximity  of  U.S. producers  to what remains a 
relatively large domestic market situates them favorably in this effort 
to adapt their products to the preferences of consumers and end users. 
The production of electrogalvanized steel for the U.S.  automobile in- 
dustry and designer clothing by the apparel industry, cited above, il- 
lustrates this potential. Yet the sobering example of the auto industry 
in the  1970s  is a reminder  that mere proximity  to the market is no 
guarantee of success in tailoring products to final demand. 
5.7.2  Joint Ventures and Onshore Production by Foreign Firms 
The advent of Japanese automobile production in the United States 
is the most visible illustration of a general trend. Honda now operates 
a plant in Marysville,  Ohio, and Nissan one in Smyrna, Tennessee, 
while Toyota and GM jointly produce a small car in what was formerly 
GM’s Fremont, California, assembly plant. Together these three op- 
erations produced more than five hundred thousand vehicles in 1986. 
Mazda, Mitsubishi, and IsuzdFuji have plans for plants in Michigan, 
Illinois, and Indiana, respectively.  In 1984, Nisshin  Steel acquired a 
stake in Wheeling-Pittsburgh and Nippon Kokan obtained half of Na- 
tional Steel, while in 1986 Kawasaki Steel acquired half of California 
Steel. Moreover, there is an increasing foreign presence in the U.S. 
minimill sector. 
To  some extent these arrangements represent attempts to import 
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efforts to boost productivity. For example, workers at the Nissan and 
Honda plants and at California Steel’s plant in Fontana are organized 
into teams responsible not only for regular production duties but for 
inspection,  materials  handling,  and  housekeeping (Katz  1985, 144). 
Moreover, onshore production enhances the ability of Japanese steel 
makers to tailor output to their customers in the U.S. automobile in- 
dustry, an important consideration for producers of coated-steel prod- 
ucts. But the principal explanation for onshore production is as a re- 
sponse to U.S. protectionism and as a hedge against even more stringent 
measures. Not only can the Japanese protect against this risk by pro- 
ducing in the United States, but this strategy itself reduces the danger 
of tighter trade restrictions by diverting the sales of Japanese companies 
from goods manufactured abroad to those manufactured in the United 
States. 
Japanese-owned  automobile  companies  project  that  “immigrant 
plants” will produce 1.8 million vehicles for the U.S. market by 1990. 
Since domestic demand is projected to grow slowly, these sales are 
likely to come partly at the expense of Japanese exports and partly at 
that of the U.S. competition. While onshore production by foreign firms 
is likely to slow the decline of  U.S. auto industry employment, it will 
only add to the difficulty domestic firms have had in maintaining market 
share. 
5.7.3  Diversification 
A final response on the part of U.S. basic industries is diversification, 
which can be understood as part of a long-standing strategy to make 
the basic industries  “less  basic.”  As  early  as  1969-71,  30  cents of 
every  dollar  invested by  steel firms was  invested  outside  of  steel- 
producing activities; by the late 1970s the ratio had risen to 33 percent 
(Acs 1984, 136-37).  USX (formerly the U.S. Steel Corporation) has 
found new outlets for its managerial and financial resources through 
acquisitions ranging from chemicals and engineering to real estate and 
railroads. The same strategy has been adopted by Japanese steel pro- 
ducers, who have branched into areas as diverse as industrial ceramics 
and silicon wafers. The principal thrust of  USX’s diversification has 
been into energy, notably through its acquisition of  Marathon Oil in 
1982 and Texas Oil and Gas in  1986. At present, only one-third  of 
USX’s revenues come from steel, with oil and gas now accounting for 
a majority of total sales. While this too represents an attempt to move 
into more promising sectors, it is also a continuance of  the steel in- 
dustry’s traditional strategy of using diversification to reduce the cy- 
clical risks of  steel making. Since energy is an important component 
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sources, steel companies can hedge against the effects of higher energy 
prices . 
5.8  Future Prospects 
What are the prospects for the basic industries in the United States? 
Clearly, the international product cycle will continue to operate. Com- 
petence in the production of the products of basic industries tends to 
be acquired in the early stages of industrialization. This international 
diffusion of standardized technologies is beyond the control of Amer- 
ican producers and policymakers. Hence developing countries where 
the costs of labor and raw materials are low should have a continuing 
if  not an increasing competitive advantage in the production of stan- 
dardized basic industry goods. U.S. basic industries, particularly those 
segments using standardized processes to produce standardized prod- 
ucts, will experience no relief from foreign competition. 
The precise impact of  this foreign competition will depend on the 
stance of U.S. trade policies. For the foreseeable future, trade in the 
products of these industries will continue to be regulated by “volun- 
tary”  restraints and bilateral quota agreements rather than tariff pro- 
tection. There is no reason, if  quotas are set at sufficiently restrictive 
levels, that production for the U.S. market could not take place do- 
mestically. Studies of U.S.  trade policy unanimously conclude that the 
costs of  such policies are high, however. Not only do the high prices 
charged domestic consumers of the products of basic industries trans- 
late into a very substantial cost per protected job, but they divert scarce 
US. resources  into the basic industries and out of alternative uses 
where their productivity is higher. The competitive difficulties of  the 
U.S. basic industries are the market’s way of signaling  that productivity 
there is relatively low. Permitting these industries to release resources 
and even facilitating their smooth transfer through adjustment assis- 
tance programs is a way of  responding constructively to the produc- 
tivity slowdown that has been the subject of so much recent attention. 
None of  this implies that the U.S. basic industries should or will 
vanish. U.  S. producers will retain some comparative advantage vis-a- 
vis developing country competitors wherever product quality and mar- 
keting are important-that  is, where skilled labor and proximity to the 
consumer confer comparative advantage. Those segments of the Amer- 
ican  automotive,  steel,  and  apparel  industries  producing  high- 
performance automobiles, electrogalvanized steel, and designer cloth- 
ing, for example, have brighter prospects than the basic industries as 
a whole. The ability of the U.S. basic industries to exploit this advan- 
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to maintain quality, to successfully tailor goods to market, and to mod- 
erate production costs, three areas where their record is not unblemished. 
Most of all, the competitiveness of these segments of the U.S. basic 
industries will depend on their ability to apply the new technologies 
developed by  the high-tech sector. Robots, computer-controlled ma- 
chine tools, and other forms of automated technology continue to offer 
improvements in productivity and quality control. They are the do- 
mestic industries’ hope of maintaining a competitive advantage as ex- 
isting technologies continue to diffuse to newly industrializing coun- 
tries. Located in a country rich in the human capital used to develop 
these new technologies, U.S. basic industries might be thought to pos- 
sess a comparative advantage in their adoption. But much depends on 
the foresightedness of  domestic producers  and on public  policy. If 
macroeconomic policies fail to keep domestic demand from declining 
and the real exchange rate from rising as wildly as in recent years, the 
investment required for the adoption of these technologies will not take 
place. If domestic producers are provided overly generous protection, 
they will have little incentive to develop and adopt these new tech- 
nologies. Policies of protection that increase basic industry employ- 
ment in the present may not be conducive to the prosperity of the U.S. 
basic industries in the future. 
Appendix 
Regression Results 
This appendix presents regression results cited in the text. Using quar- 
terly data for the period  1973:  1 -  1986: 1, employment is regressed on 
measures of  the real exchange rate, the relative price of energy, the 
economywide unemployment  rate, and the sectoral real wage. Data 
and specification follow Branson and Love (1986) with three modifi- 
cations.  First, the dependent  variable  is number of  production em- 
ployees instead of total employees. Second, a distributed lag on average 
hourly earnings is appended to their basic specification to permit the 
impact of labor costs on employment to be examined. Third, the sample 
period is altered, starting only in 1973:  1 and extending through 1986:  1. 
Data on both number of production employees and hourly earnings are 
drawn from  U.S. Department  of  Labor, Employment and Earnings 
(various issues). Hourly earnings are deflated by the CPI to construct 
a measure of  the real wage. Other data are as described by Branson 
and Love. The real exchange rate is the IMF index of relative unit 
labor costs; the real energy price index is the CPI-Urban energy price 343  International Competition in the Products of U.S. Basic Industries 
index divided by the CPI-Urban index for all consumer goods; the 
unemployment rate is for all workers, economywide. 
Results appear in table 5.A.  1. While the results for all manufacturing 
are quite satisfactory, the results for the four basic industries vary. In 
contrast to all manufacturing, employment in each shows a significant 
downward trend even after controlling for cyclical conditions, the real 
exchange rate, the real price of energy, and the sectoral real wage. 
Only the textile industry fails to exhibit strong sensitivity to the busi- 
ness cycle (as captured by the coefficients on the civilian unemployment 
rate). There is considerable variability in the impact of energy prices, 
which increases as one moves from textiles to apparel to steel and 
finally to motor vehicles.  The large coefficients in the equations for 
vehicles and steel suggest that the energy price variable may also be 
picking up the impact of structural factors (shifts toward smaller cars 
or steel substitutes whose timing coincides with the energy price shocks). 
Similarly, changes in the real exchange rate had a more powerful impact 
on motor vehicles and steel than textiles and apparel, suggesting that 
the MFA limited the effects of import competition even more severely 
than automobile and steel VERs. Finally, the impact of real wages is 
generally negative but uniformly weak. (Before concluding from this 
that firms do not operate on their labor demand curves, it would be 
useful to adjust hourly earnings for productivity and to deflate them 
by a measure of sector-specific producer prices.) 
Table 5.A.2 uses these regressions to decompose changes in U.S. 
competitiveness (as they  are reflected in  changes in  production em- 
ployment) into these four components and a residual. The first line 
shows that  slack macroeconomic conditions, real exchange rate ap- 
preciation, and higher energy prices all tended to reduce U.S.  manu- 
facturing employment between the second half of the 1970s and the 
first half of the 1980s. Only some slight decline of real manufacturing 
wages moderated the trend. Of  these factors, the dollar’s real appre- 
ciation was the most important; by itself it would have caused pro- 
duction employment in manufacturing to fall by more than an eighth. 
But U.  S. manufacturing employment declined considerably less than 
the movement of these variables would predict. Other sources of en- 
hanced competitiveness (“other factors”  in table 5.A.2) contributed 
significantly to the maintenance of manufacturing employment over the 
period. 
The basic industries show many of the same patterns but important 
differences as well. Employment in steel and vehicles is more cyclically 
sensitive than employment in textiles and apparel, more strongly af- 
fected by movements in the real exchange rate, and more responsive 
to changes in the relative price of  energy. Although the recent mod- 
eration of real manufacturing wages has stimulated employment in all Table 5.A.1  Regression Results:  Determinants of  Production Employment, 1973:l-1986:l 
Independent Variable 
(length of distributed lag) 
Sector 
Real  Real  Real 
Exchange  Energy  Hourly 
Unemployment  Rate  Price  Earnings 
Constant  Trend  (4)  (6)  (4)  (8)  P  R2 
All manufacturing  10.916 
(12.13) 
Textiles (SIC 22)  7.906 
(2.02) 
Apparel (SIC 23)  7.655 
(7.65) 
Iron and steel  11.104 
(SIC 331)  (5.29) 
Motor vehicles  14.491 
(SIC 371)  (3.90) 
-0.001  -0.300 
(0.19)  (12.25) 
-0.006  -0.134 
(2.25)  (1.01) 
-0.007  -0.147 
(6.20)  (4.56) 
(5.55)  (3.40) 
(2.97)  (3.14) 
-0.013  -0.256 
-0.010  -0.238 
-  0.687 
(3.45) 







-  0.494 






-  1.057 
(1.37) 













,057  ,986 
.I89  ,863 
,143  .984 
.546  .993 
,027  ,947 
Source: See text. 
Nore: Dependent variable is log of production employees. F-statistics for sum of coefficients are in parentheses  below coefficient 
estimates. Numbers in parentheses below variable names denote number of lagged values of the explanatory variable included. 
The current values of  all variables but real hourly earnings are also included. All equations are estimated on quarterly data 
using a Cohrane-Orcutt correction. Table 5.A.2  Decomposition of  Trends in U.S. Basic Industry Employment from 
1973:1-1980:1  to 1981:1-1986:1 
Percentage Change in Production Employment 
Attributable to 
Real 
Cyclical  Exchange  Energy  Real  Other 
Total  Factors  Rate  Prices  Wages  Factors 
All manufacturing  -8.4  -7.2  -  13.3  -2.0  0.5  13.6 
-  13.8  Textiles (SIC 22)  -20.2  -3.2  -  4.7 
Apparel (SIC 23)  -13.9  -3.5  -  2.4  5.0  5.4  -  18.4 
Iron and steel (SIC 331)  -47.9  -6.1  -  9.7  -24.1  1.4  -  9.4 
1.4  0.1 
Motor vehicles (SIC 371)  -  16.5  -5.7  -9.6  -26.0  0.6  24.2 
Source: Computed from regressions reported in table 5.A. 1. “Other factors” incorporates the trend 
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four industries, the contribution of  wage trends to the change in total 
industry employment has been relatively small. A striking feature of 
the table is the contrast in the impact of “other factors” between motor 
vehicles and the other basic industries. In textiles, apparel, and iron 
and steel, these other factors contributed to the decline in production 
employment over the period. The interpretation of this finding is that 
the further intensification of foreign competition tended to add to the 
three industries’ competitive woes. In automobiles, in contrast, other 
factors account for a significant rise in production employment. Whether 
this has been due to increased barriers to foreign competition, notably 
the negotiation of  Japanese export restraints  in  1981, or to new in- 
vestment, marketing, and product development strategies on the part 
of the U.S. automobile producers cannot be determined by regression 
alone. 
Notes 
Charles Butler, Carl Hamilton, Joseph Kalt, and James Love kindly provided 
data for this  paper; Alan  Auerbach, Robert Crandall,  Kala  Krishna, Peter 
Lindert, David Meerschwam,  and Hans Mueller provided  much-appreciated 
comments. 
1. See Gerschenkron 1962. The basic reference on the international product 
cycle is Vernon 1966. 
2.  Raw  steel production  (in millions of  net tons),  average number of em- 
ployees, and import penetration  ratio in  steel are taken from American Iron 
and Steel Institute 1986 and AISI Annual Statistical Bulletins. Motor vehicle 
production (cars, motor trucks, and buses), all employees in motor vehicle and 
equipment manufacturing, and import penetration ratio are constructed from 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures, 
various issues. Employment in the textile mill products industry and in apparel 
and related products is from American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Texrile 
Hilights, various issues. Output and import penetration ratios for textiles and 
apparel-apparel  fabric are measured in square-yard equivalents and taken from 
American Textile Manufacturers  Institute  1986. 
3.  Total employees  is from U.S. Department of  Commerce, Employment 
and Earnings, various issues. 
4. Both  Chrysler and Ford  then reduced  capacity  and employment in the 
early  1980s. General  Motors followed  suit late in  1986, announcing  that  11 
facilities  employing twenty-nine thousand workers would close permanently 
in 1987. 
5. Figures for the steel industry, in millions of net tons, are taken from annual 
reports of the American Iron and Steel Institute, various issues. Figures for 
the automobile industry are percentage  of  domestic retail sales of passenger 
cars accounted for by imports, taken from Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures. 
Figures for textiles, imports as a share of domestic apparent consumption, are 
measured in square-yard equivalents and taken from American Textile Man- 
ufacturers Institute  1986. 347  International Competition in the Products of U.S. Basic Industries 
6. This growth rate is for the nine leading third world producers, computed 
from Hogan  1983, 155. 
7.  The effective  tax  rate is  from  Ando and  Auerbach  1985.  For  further 
discussion of these policies, see Saxonhouse  1983. 
8. A significant share of these debts had been extended by the government 
itself, especially after 1970. The cost to the states of the restructuring program 
has been estimated variously at $2 billion to $6 billion (U.S. Congress, Joint 
Economic Committee  1981, 30-31). 
9.  As the authors are careful  to note, their estimates must be interpreted 
cautiously, since relatively few steel companies (two Japanese, one American) 
and relatively few auto companies (one Japanese, three American) are included 
in their sample. 
10. Apparent consumption is domestic production plus imports minus ex- 
ports, taken from OECD 1985 and publications of the American Iron and Steel 
Institute, with figures from AISI publications  converted to ingot equivalents 
by the OECD method. The trend line is the OLS regression: 
App. Cons./GNP = 0.064 -  0.0012*time. 
Here and in subsequent notes, figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Breaking 
the trend in 1973 and  1979: 
App. Cons./GNP = 0.056 - 0.0001*time - 0.0015*post72 - 0.0014*post78. 
Equations such as these are not strictly interpretable as demand curves since 
they do not adjust the consumption ratio for relative price effects. In the case 
of steel, however, such adjustments are of little consequence. Adding the price 
of metals and metal products relative to the prices of all intermediate materials 
and  supplies changes the coefficient on the time trend  reported above only 
from 0.0012 to 0.0013. 
(26.82)  (7.66) 
(28.13)  (0.32)  (2.54)  (1.76) 
11. See the discussion in Jones 1986, 56-58. 
12. The data of Barnett and Schorsch (1983,41) suggest that Germany reached 
this stage after 1970 and Japan after 1973. Cross-section data suggest that steel 
intensity declines once per capita GNP reaches $2,000 (1963 prices); see Jones 
1986, 58. 
13. For additional statistics, see Barnett and Schorsch  1983, 40. 
14.  An  OLS regression  of  the apparent consumptiodreal  GNP ratio  on 
deviations of log real GNP from trend yields a coefficient significantly greater 
than zero at standard confidence levels: 
App. Cons./GNP = 0.0479 + 0.132*(deviation of log real GNP from trend). 
(25.47)  (2.69) 
15. De la Torre  1984, 24.  For evidence  on Engel’s law  in  the context of 
16. Data from OECD 1982 and previous issues. The trend is 
textile consumption, see OECD 1983, 29. 
Expenditure share on clothing  = 9.760 - 0.134*time. 
(82.94)  (15.00) 
17. The slope of  the OLS regression line, while negative, differs insignifi- 
cantly from zero: 
App. Cons./GNP  = 4.960 - 0.015*time. 
(7.57)  (0.43) 348  Barry EichengreedCharles W.  Parry/Philip Caldwell 
The regression for cyclical sensitivity of the apparent consumption ratio is 
App. Cons./GNP = 4.674  + 8.979*(deviation of  log real GNP from trend). 
(33.58)  (2.11) 
18. Between  1973 and 1984, for example, real operating cost fell by nearly 
19 percent. This calculation adjusts total cost per mile, from Motor Vehicle 
Facts and Figures '85, for changes in the cost of living index. 
19. These figures from the U.S. Department of Labor omit nonpayroll items 
such as pensions, insurance, and supplemental unemployment benefits to fa- 
cilitate the comparison with all manufacturing. Figures including estimates of 
nonwage compensation are used, however, in the international comparison of 
basic industries. Since nonwage earnings have been more important historically 
in  steel and autos than elsewhere in the economy, fig.  5.7 presents a lower 
bound on the premium  over all manufacturing received by workers in these 
two industries. 
20. In 1986 there were short stoppages at LTV and Armco and a large-scale 
strike at USX (formerly U.S. Steel), the last of which left twenty-two thousand 
workers idle. 
21.To be exact, 56.4 percent. See U.S.  Department of  Commerce 1978. 
22. Their 1979 contract, for example, provided for a one percent hourly wage 
increase for every 0.26 point rise in the cost of living (Kreinin 1984, 46). 
23.  National currency compensation  costs are converted to  U.S. dollars 
using  average market  exchange rates.  For well-known  reasons, their dollar 
equivalents  should  not be taken as measures of living standards. Insofar as 
market exchange rates reflect the relative price of traded goods, however, this 
is the measure relevant  to discussions of comparative costs in  traded goods 
industries. 
24. Note that estimates for steel in table 5.8 differ from those in table 5.10. 
Figures in  the latter table have  been  adjusted  by  the Labor Department to 
enhance international comparability.  See U.S. Department of  Labor 1984. 
25. Similarly, in steel the establishment of voluntary labor-management par- 
ticipation teams was encouraged by the 1980 basic steel agreement. By the end 
of  1985 there were approximately five hundred such teams functioning in the 
steel industry. The discussion of automotive labor relations that follows draws 
mainly  Katz  1985, chap.  4,  and  National  Academy  of  Engineering  1983, 
chap. 7. 
26. Capital expenditures in millions of dollars are taken from American Iron 
and  Steel  Institute  Statistical  Highlights,  various  issues; American  Textile 
Manufacturers Association Textile Hilights, various issues; and Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers  Association,  MVMA Facts and Figures, various  issues. De- 
partment of Commerce estimates of capital expenditures in U .S. manufacturing 
appear in the last two of these sources. 
27.  In a survey of  textile industry executives, Toyne et al. (1984, 135-36) 
found this to be one of the principal motives for investment. 
28. See, for example, AISI Annual Report for 1985, p. 9. 
29. Although their methods, which assume a twenty-year life for plant and 
equipment, may  exaggerate  the rate of  depreciation  and thus overstate the 
extent of disinvestment, this is unlikely to affect the thrust of their conclusions. 
Acs (1984, 141), however, estimates that investment in new capacity exceeded 
depreciation in thirteen of twenty-one years from  1960 to 1980. 
30.  In the first half of the sixties the share of output technically suited to 
continuous casting was lower only in Austria; in the second half, it was lower 
only in Austria and Sweden (Schenk 1974, 245). 349  International Competition in the Products of U.S.  Basic Industries 
31. Continuously cast steel and crude steel production,  in metric tons, and 
share of  the total produced  using open hearths are taken from International 
Iron and Steel Institute 1985, tables 2, 4, and 5. Linear regression yields 
R* = 0.05.  % Continuously Cast = 66.70 - 0.78 % Open Hearth; 
(13.60)  (1.14) 
The sample is comprised of  twenty-five developed and developing countries, 
all of those for which data could be obtained excluding Eastern Europe. 
% Continuously Cast = 12.18 -  0.621 % Open Hearth 
- 1.10 % Output Growth 70-75  + 0.06 % Output Growth 75-84;  R2 = .12. 
Data are as above, with the addition of  1970 output from OECD 1985. One 
reason output growth does not have a stronger effect is that in some countries 
where there have been systematic programs of rationalization, the authorities, 
when  shutting down  excess capacity,  have  shut down those works without 
continuous casters. Hence in some countries where output has declined most 
rapidly, the share of steel continuously cast is highest. 
33. Data are from International Iron and Steel Institute Yearbooks, various 
issues. 
34. See for example Adams and Dirlam 1966. Oster (1982) found that large 
U.S. producers were slower to adopt the BOF than their smaller counterparts. 
However, in the subsequent study mentioned later, Karlson (1986) extended 
the analysis to encompass not only the choice between the BOF and the open 
hearth but the electric furnace as well, concluding that variations in adoption 
lag by plant size were trivial. It remains possible,  however, as industry  ob- 
servers have  argued, that all  U.S.  firms, irrespective of  size, were  slow to 
adopt the BOF. 
32. The regression is 
(12.19)( -0.91) 
(1.10)  (1.44) 
35. For details, see Barnett and Crandall 1986. 
36. Calculated from Mueller and Kawahito 1978,19. Japanese energy intensity 
ofproduction  has  fallen dramatically since the time ofthese  calculations. Between 
1973 and 1985, energy consumption per ton of crude steel production fell by 20 
percent as the industry shifted toward coal-based energy in place of oil. 
37. Arpan et al. 1982, 108-9.  However, higher oil prices have improved the 
competitive position of U.S. national-gas-based synthetic fibre producers. The 
regressions in the appendix suggest that energy prices have had an insignificant 
impact on U.S. textile and apparel employment. 
38. The estimates in the appendix suggest still larger employment effects. 
39. Japan’s 1937 exports of 124 million yards of cotton cloth were not matched 
until 1955 (Brandis 1982, 7). 
40. There nonetheless exists a great number of studies of this question. Since 
they have recently been reviewed by Hufbauer, Berliner, and Elliott 1986, only 
a selection of the most recent estimates is discussed here. 
41. Stabilizing the market share of imports may have been the underlying 
objective of the scheme, which was administered with varying severity so as 
to achieve it (Barnett and Schorsch 1983, 241). 
42. Data are taken from Paine Webber, various issues. The export price is 
the Antwerp spot price. 
43. The average number  of  production  workers  in  1983-84  was  170,000. 
Assuming it to have been 22,000 less in the absence of restraints, the share of 
employment accounted for by restraints is 22,000/(170,000-22,0) = 15 percent. 350  Barry Eichengreen/Charles W.  Parry/Philip Caldwell 
44.  The point is not that domestic prices are 30 percent higher and domestic 
steel industry employment is correspondingly  higher under VERs than they 
were in  the preceding  period  of  trigger  prices. Rather it  is  that prices  are 
approximately 30 percent higher than they would be under free trade. 
45. See Hufbauer, Berliner, and Elliott  1986, 256, for other estimates. 
46. U.S.  capital expenditures for environmental  control are the sum of air 
and water expenditures. Those for Japan are the sum of  air and water and 
relatively  small industrial waste, noise and vibration,  and miscellaneous ex- 
penditures.  U.S. total crude steel production  is measured in net tons, while 
Japanese figures have been converted to net from metric  tons.  Sources are 
AISI Statistical Highlights, various  issues, and unpublished  MITI  estimates 
supplied by the Japan Steel Information Center. 
47. There are exceptions  to this rule, such as substantial expenditures on 
pollution control by Brazilian steel companies. 
48. Eichengreen and van der Ven  1984 reports estimates of these costs. 
49. This is true of  all industrial countries; see for example Marsden et al. 
50. For details, see Toyne et al. 1984, chap. 4. 
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2. Charles W. Parry 
Basic Materials in a Global Economy 
In this comment I do not speak for all basic industry today, nor do I 
touch on those that were well covered in Barry Eichengreen’s paper. 
Rather, I speak generally of factors affecting many basic industries and 
give some specific examples, using Alcoa as a proxy for other basic 
materials industries or producers. 
Some underlying conditions affect almost all basic industries. They 
are (1) capacity exceeding demand; (2) low prices, a normal outcome 
of overcapacity; (3) inadequate financial returns; (4)  high, if  leveling, 
labor costs and an unproductive set of relationships between the three 
affected parties; (5)  a broad and perhaps permanent reduction in the 
material intensity of the developed economies in general and the U.S. 
economy specifically; and (6) a permanent shift in comparative advan- 
tage and factor costs to LDCs and to government-owned operations 
where the reason for being is not necessarily return on investment. 
I return to these characteristics in a moment. But some other, if less 
pervasive,  problems  also affect  the basic  industries,  and I want to 
mention them briefly. All industries and all companies are not affected 
by them, but they prevail to a degree worth pointing out. 
First, the macroeconomic environment in which U .S. industry op- 
erates is deteriorating. The combination of budget and trade deficits 
equals declining competitiveness. In fact, the so-called Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 will actually further reduce U.S.  industrial competitiveness by 
stalling investment in productivity and by virtually eliminating the pos- 
sibility of  repatriating earnings from overseas operations. 
Second, the strength of the dollar has created competitive pressures 
in recent years that have severely affected many basic industries. At 
its high, the strong dollar gave most European and Japanese aluminum 
producers a cost advantage of  20 percent or more vis-a-vis American 
producers. The result was a flood of imports of products that, all other 
things equal, would not have been competitive. 
While the dollar has fallen against the yen, the deutsche mark, and 
some other currencies,  the flood has not yet  ebbed  significantly. It 
seems to me that the dollar will have to fall another 15 percent to 20 
percent before those imports retreat to a more typical level. Obviously, 
those basic industry companies that are multinational have not been 
as badly injured by the high dollar as those operating only within U.S. 
borders. But as the dollar falls, we must begin to worry about renewed 
inflation and the risking risk of disintermediation on the part of foreign 
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Third, and perhaps more important, the production of basic goods 
today has changed dramatically and probably permanently. For many 
years, in some cases more than a century, the most economic produc- 
tion of basic materials came from vertically integrated systems. There 
were economies of  scale that required the matching of various steps 
in the flow from raw material to finished product. Let me give you an 
example from the aluminum industry. 
In our business the critical cost-and  the technical fulcrum-was  in 
smelting, where the refined ore was turned into metal. There was an 
optimum  size for a  smelter, depending on its power supply and its 
specific technology. To provide a feedstock, a refining plant had to be 
designed-not  only to meet the needs of  the smelter, but to take ad- 
vantage of a particular body of  bauxite. Assuring both a secure and 
profitable operation required some pretty deft planning and design work. 
In the early days, it was far more art than science. 
Today, the need for an integrated system is at best questionable. The 
mines, the refining plants, and the smelters are all off the shelf, tech- 
nically. Bauxite, alumina, and aluminum ingot are commodities, largely 
undifferentiated.  What matters today  lies downstream, in fabricated 
products and in parts and systems of parts made from those products. 
Recognizing this change, the U.S. aluminum industry is disintegrating. 
This change requires a wholly new mind-set, but it is driven by changes 
that are outside the control of the once-integrated companies. 
Other basic industries have made similar responses where their pro- 
duction streams are complex. Steel, copper, tin, aluminum-all  differ 
in their complexity, but all have the characteristics of  a commodity. 
U.S. Steel today would be rolling British slabs at Fairless if  the steel- 
workers had not objected. Aluminum was the last to go. If a definition 
of  basic industry includes the automakers, an interesting parallel can 
be found in their complex assortment of  outsourcing of parts, their 
joint ventures and international production systems. 
My  point  is that the once familiar, self-contained, vertically inte- 
grated production systems are coming apart and that  the trend will 
continue as basic industry continues to become globalized. 
Now,  let  me  return  to my  list  of  underlying  conditions in  basic 
industries. 
In  almost every basic industry, there  is overcapacity. From cus- 
tomers'  and.consumers' points of  view, this has been a good thing. 
Prices for basic materials have not contributed to inflation and, in the 
opinions of many, have actually been deflationary. But prices ultimately 
are a reflection of supply and demand, and shareholders are not known 
to be overly stupid for long. 
In reaction, most basic industry companies in the United States have 
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itive (which normally means those that are most  technically  out of 
date). In the case of my  own company, we have written off uncom- 
petitive  capacity,  even beyond  the tonnage  we  typically  carried for 
market development purposes. In the future, in periods of high demand 
we will buy what we are unable to produce. Reports in the media lead 
me to believe that we are not alone in this strategy. 
There are, of course, real questions surrounding a strategy of limited 
capacity. Implicit in such a strategy is an assessment of limited market 
growth.  There are also those who are uncomfortable with the long- 
term impact on national defense capabilities. 
The reality of a world market in basic materials, however, effectively 
precludes any meaningful debate of those questions. Most, if  not all, 
basic materials are not commodities. Commodities by definition are 
undifferentiated, so cost is the single determinant. In U.S. basic in- 
dustry, critical costs are often determined by public policy, which has 
frequently been less than kind toward industry. 
Again, an example. There are three major cost areas in producing 
primary  aluminum: raw  materials, labor,  and electricity.  In this ex- 
ample, raw materials are of lesser consideration, since economical ore 
sources do not exist in the United States; we must either import bauxite 
or its refined intermediates. 
In the case of  energy, to the extent that we have a national policy 
on electricity, it is a policy of populism. Power rates that once were 
based on cost of service have increasingly been based on the political 
expedient of keeping rates low for individual users. Since electricity is 
the largest single cost component in a pound of aluminum, it is critical. 
In the past decade, the United States has gone from being a low-cost 
aluminum producer to being a high-cost producer. That reality is re- 
flected by the smelter shutdowns of recent years. 
I mentioned  the third factor of cost-labor.  Basic industry in  the 
United  States has long been the country’s mmt unionized sector. In 
recent years, however, declining demand in some industries and flat- 
tening growth rates in others have put great pressure on labor costs. 
The three components of labor cost-pay,  benefits, and work rules- 
have all come under attack in varying degrees. But the real kicker here, 
and one that neither company nor union can control, is the development 
of the global economy. National unions, no matter how powerful, have 
precious little leverage in a global economy. 
Union leaders have been in the forefront of  those demanding pro- 
tectionism. Yet union leaders-and  past managements-share  much of 
the blame for the noncompetitiveness of many U.S. basic materials. 
Those industries and companies whose operations lie entirely within 
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problems. Those of us with operations around the world are protected 
in varying degrees by our flexibility. While the steel industry, for ex- 
ample, joins with  the  United  Steelworkers in  demanding protection 
from imports, the aluminum industry concentrates instead on seeking 
fair trade and in opening markets in other developed economies. Other 
basic industries, such as tin and copper, have also been more global in 
their outlook. 
I  said  at the  start that  high  labor costs are a problem  for basic 
industry. I also said that there is an unproductive set of relationships 
between the three affected parties. And there are three parties: man- 
agement, employees, and the unions themselves. 
My experience last year in dealing with the first simultaneous strike 
by both of Alcoa’s major unions brings me to the conclusion that union 
leaders do not necessarily behave in the best interests of their members. 
Nor  are union  members  necessarily hard-line, recalcitrant,  or anti- 
management. In fact, the agenda of  the union may be quite different 
from the agenda of the employee. This reality of separate agendas may 
serve the interests  of  both companies and employees in the future, 
providing common ground for experimentation and renewed trust. It 
remains to be seen whether the agenda of the international union be- 
comes the odd man out. 
So far, what I have discussed relates to some of the underlying causes 
of the general lack of competitiveness in basic industry. Those causes 
are fairly well known to anyone who has sought them out. I end my 
presentation  by  giving  you  my  thoughts  on  the  future  for  these 
enterprises. 
First, basic industry has to make its case to the public for relief from 
those policies that affect it negatively. I refer specifically to such pol- 
icies as a tax policy that penalizes  investment, energy policies that 
pretty much rule out competitive costs, and trade policies that stifle 
rather than encourage competition. Changes in public policy are es- 
sential to create a supportive macroeconomic environment within which 
U.S. basic industry can become competitive. 
Next, those of us in basic industry have got to get our act together 
and compete. This means coming to grips with new technologies, step- 
ping up to the sometimes frightening prospect of reducing labor costs, 
and internationalizing mind-sets by internationalizing operations. We 
must rid ourselves of the false notion that the United States is a separate 
island in the sea of world trade. 
In addition, U.S. basic industries need to get back to competing by 
going back into the marketplace. Products must compete on cost, but 
they also must compete differentially. The day of waiting for customers 
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are essentially undifferentiated. By adding value to a cuet.omer’s  prod- 
uct, a basic material is no longer the same as all others-a  concept too 
many have either forgotten or never learned. 
Finally, US.  basic material producers must pursue quality. Quality 
must be redefined in terms of the user: quality products are those that 
add value because they  eliminate rejects, cause no incidents in  the 
customer’s operations, and allow the customer to produce a quality 
product in turn. 
Given a stable macroeconomic environment, U.S. basic industries 
can compete. The question then becomes one of whether it will choose 
to compete. 
3.  Philip Caldwell 
U.S. Competitiveness in a Global Environment 
While there are many differences  among industries and companies, 
most of my more general observations on basic industries are intended 
to be applicable to manufacturing overall. 
Success of a firm requires  success in fundamentals in  the way it 
plans, funds, and conducts its business. Product development, quality, 
cost, customer value-dl  achieved within the context that the incom- 
ings must exceed the outgoings over time-are  the sine qua non; pro- 
ductivity, human resource management, and integrity are essential in- 
gredients wherever  the business is located.  These qualities  are not 
proprietary to the United States or to any nation, and the opportunities 
for competitive advantage for a firm or a country are not necessarily 
great or long lasting either. 
Let me illustrate this fragility with an example from the automobile 
industry in the United States. 
U.S. automakers have made dramatic gains in profitability, quality, 
productivity,  supplier relations, and work force management. But in 
major market segments, foreign automakers continue to gain shares of 
markets.  Foreign producers  continue to make  major innovations in 
product  and manufacturing processes.  If  present  economic relation- 
ships continue, existing U.S. small cur and sports cur manufacturing 
capacity will be largely redundant by 1990 in a free trade environment. 
Analysts project that only two-thirds of domestic auto manufacturing 
capacity will be used. By  1990, auto-related employment at the four 
domestic auto producers will decline to 340,000 from 700,000 in  1978 359  International Competition in the Products of U.S. Basic Industries 
and 400,000 in 1983. A similar situation also exists in Western Europe 
and may yet occur in Japan by the next decade, 
Martin Feldstein (1986) gets to the heart of the problems and op- 
portunities facing basic manufacturing industries in the United States: 
The principal problem with which the world economies must deal 
during the coming decade is the unsustainable imbalance of inter- 
national trade. The United  States cannot continue to have annual 
trade deficits of more than $100 billion financed by an ever increasing 
inflow of foreign capital. The U.S. trade deficit will therefore soon 
shrink and, as it does, the other countries of the world will experience 
a corresponding reduction in their trade surpluses. Indeed, within 
the next decade, the United States will  shift from trade deficit to 
trade surplus. The challenge is to achieve this rebalancing of world 
demand in a way that avoids both a decline in real economic activity 
and an increase in the rate of  inflation. 
The United States has been in a competitive decline for the last two 
decades, losing out to countries like Japan, and more recently Taiwan 
and Korea. These countries have little natural wealth, but they have 
exploited technology-imported  largely from the United States-while 
skillfully managing their human and financial resources and policies. 
As more countries successfully imitate this strategy, our ability to earn 
a rising standard of living becomes progressively more difficult. 
Our basic industries began losing market shares in the last decade, 
but this was sometimes characterized as the failure of  management, 
the stranglehold of unions, or unusual circumstances. Other segments 
were enjoying a boom as oil prices and exploration increased and high 
tech became the panacea, which some once thought would save us all 
in the United States. 
Then in the 1980s Americans went on a credit binge-government, 
corporations, and individuals-consuming more than they produced- 
creating the twin deficits of budget and trade. 
Feldstein (1986) describes the trade situation this way: 
The recentness of  the U.S. shift from trade surplus to trade deficit 
deserves emphasis because it indicates that the cause of the trade 
deficit is not the character of the American workforce or of American 
management, as some have recently suggested. Such fundamental 
aspects of  American industry cannot change in as short a time as 
the five years in which the United States has gone from a persistent 
trade surplus to a massive trade deficit. For the same reason it is 
wrong to attribute the massive trade deficit to a fundamental dete- 
rioration  of  U.S.  productivity,  of  American product quality, or of 
other basic aspects of potential competitiveness. The primary reason 
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dollar that occurred between  1980 and the spring of  1985. This un- 
precedented increase in  the dollar dramatically increased the price 
of American products relative to decline while merchandise imports 
have increased by nearly 50 percent. 
Of  course, there were other causes. Private sector managers  and 
government politicians and administrators contributed their deficien- 
cies. We  all put some dirt in the carburetor, but the high value of the 
dollar was  the common  hurdle  of  discouragement across American 
industry and only a very few could jump it without injury. 
Bruce Scott and others of the Harvard Business School have studied 
in depth the subject of national competitiveness. Since I find my  own 
experiences in tune with their findings, in these remarks I quote liberally 
from their writings (Scott and Lodge 1984; Scott 1987). 
National competitiveness is a national aspiration. In its most fun- 
damental sense, it means the ability of a nation to earn a rising standard 
of living. As our trade deficit tells us, our present standard of living is 
only partially earned. More and more recently it has been borrowed. 
Competitiveness in part is a question of goals. The United States is 
shouldering important international commitments for military security, 
economic aid, and various programs to insure a measure of economic 
security and to assist the least favored  segments of  other societies. 
Competitiveness for the United States means financing these various 
commitments without falling behind other industrial countries in stan- 
dard of living. This sounds like perpetual motion to me, and I do not 
think we can do it. It is time this load be shared more broadly by Japan 
and others who enjoy the benefits and have the capacity to pay. 
Reestablishment  of  a competitive economy will require changes in 
national priorities, policies, and institutional practices. 
Public policy has promoted short-term consumer benefits on the one 
hand and added a growing array of consumer entitlements on the other. 
The role of Americans as producers has been taken for granted. The 
United States must adopt a more balanced view of Americans as pro- 
ducers as well as consumers. We  really can kill the goose that laid the 
golden egg. The choice for the United States is either to increase the 
competitiveness of its economy or to revise downward its national goals 
and international commitments. Private firms do this or they do not 
survive. 
In our quest for “free and fair competition,” we say that true com- 
petitiveness can only be evaluated on a “level playing field.”  Such a 
definition overlooks the fact that countries have differing goals, differ- 
ing economic strategies, and differing roles for their economic uctors- 
notably for government. Countries have different ideas of  what the 
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Brazil, Japan, Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan do not necessarily share 
our view of the system. For them the goal is not so much to raise short- 
term living standards as to increase national wealth and economic power. 
Government is an active participant in their economies; part player, 
part coach, perhaps part manager. As a player-coach, government is 
concerned with shaping the outcomes as well as establishing and en- 
forcing the rules. We enact trade laws; our competitors complete trade 
programs. 
The United States focuses on rules and procedures and complains 
that some other countries do not play according to the rules. This is 
an expression of an implicit U.S. economic strategy which assumes 
that free markets and interfirm competition give the best outcomes for 
the United  States and presumably will  for other countries  as well. 
Government, in the U.S. view of the system, is a referee and not a 
player,  coach, or manager. Government takes responsibility  for the 
fairness of  the game; the players, coaches, and their managers have 
responsibility for the outcome. 
In part due to our munificence, some countries, which have been 
able to pursue strategies different from ours and whose governments 
play a role different from ours, have consistently had higher levels of 
performance and  thus  have been  more  competitive than  us.  These 
countries, notably Japan, have become models for other countries that 
are also trying to accelerate their economic growth. These countries, 
all  of  which  have focused  on manufactured exports as the leading 
economic sector, have had a remarkable impact on international com- 
petition. 
True “leveling of the playing field” may require changes in our theory 
of  international competition. It may mean that we as well as others 
must change. 
Zysman and Cohen (1987) say that  “we may have become a post 
industrial society, but we are not a post industrial economy”  and “it 
is important that we not become one.” 
We  need  manufactured  exports to pay for our imports.  After de- 
ducting interest, dividends, and fees for “services”  in our trade sta- 
tistics, service income is only 15 percent of income from manufactures. 
At home we  may make  hamburgers for each other and take in the 
washing, but we cannot exchange those  services overseas for auto- 
mobiles and VCRs. Manufacturing is the core market for much of  the 
services economy. 
Technological innovation is frequently spawned in a manufacturing 
environment and engineering skills at home atrophy when production 
is located overseas. A healthy, vibrant manufacturing base is a must 
if  our military security is to have real substance. Can we really forgo 
the capability to supply machine tools and semiconductors? I might 362  Barry EichengreenKharles W.  ParrylPhilip Caldwell 
risk leaving home without my American Express card, but it would be 
foolhardy and irresponsible to rely on a national security establishment 
supplied totally or primarily in its essentials by friend or foe overseas. 
Leadership of the free world requires strength and that includes eco- 
nomic strength. 
I could  spend considerable time enumerating the many  steps we 
Americans need to take to keep America competitive. Since they have 
been  well  documented in  a number  of  thoughtful  studies, including 
most recently the report of the Young Commission on Competitiveness, 
I need not repeat them for this group. 
I conclude these brief remarks, however, by posing two challenges, 
particularly relevant to this group and to the constituencies we represent. 
1. In physical  sciences, R&D programs are often directed toward 
finding solutions to problems standing in our way. Many times they are 
successful because we focus brainpower adequate to the task in quality 
and quantity. Could we do more of this in R&D in the social sciences? 
Most practitioners I know believe the international monetary system 
does not  deal  satisfactorily  with establishing  currency  values.  Is  it 
possible that new technologies in communications and the impact of 
the rapid transfer of huge sums of  money across national boundaries 
as compared to the transfer of physical goods have outmoded important 
facets of the present system? Could we concentrate our thoughts and 
launch a serious search for a more stable mechanism by which we can 
price our currencies? 
2. Can there be a closer partnership between economists and the 
principles that guide economic thought and the practitioners of business 
in their pursuit of  competitiveness in  a global economy? A greater 
exposure to shared experiences could make both groups more effective 
for our country and for the world. 
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Summary of Discussion 
Saburo Okita asked  whether  the Japanese  should  move their parts 
manufacturing capacity to the United States as they have done with 
assembling, given the large surplus capacity that exists in the United 
States. Caldwell responded that surplus capacity is a problem in many 
industries and that what is needed is a solid dose of growth. The Jap- 
anese could have foreseen this excess capacity when they made their 
investment decisions. 
In evaluating the global competitiveness of  U.S. basic  industries, 
Philip Caldwell identified exchange rates as the broadest  and most 
troublesome factor for business management. Wide and rapid swings 
in currency values result primarily from macroeconomic factors. In- 
dividual companies and industries are incapable of dealing with these 
causes yet they bear the consequences from the frequent changes in 
relative value. Basic industries with heavy capital requirements needing 
long capital payback periods are particularly devastated. Such has been 
the effect in many parts of the U.S. economy during the 1980s. 
He called for fresh thinking on this issue, arguing that exchange rates 
today are not predominantly established by the impact of the physical 
flow of goods, but by the overwhelming size of money flows across 
international boundaries.  He suggested that many now feel that the 
floating regime is not a satisfactory long-term solution. He pointed out 
that  the Japanese  are just as upset  as the Americans or any other 
nationality when there are major changes in exchange rate values. 
Okita continued this line of thought by proposing a contradiction in 
liberalization of capital and commodity flows, in that liberalizing capital 
flows might lead to an excessively fluctuating exchange rate. 
Robert Ingersoll contended that orderly marketing agreements and 
other government activity would not solve the problem. The Japanese 
circumvented the  1969  steel OMA by  increasing  the value  of  their 
products, and neither this OMA nor the current automobile restriction 
helps U.S. competitiveness. In the long run a managed economy is not 
as innovative or good for the general public as a more free economy. 
He proposed that Martin Feldstein’s solution, involving a reduction in 
the trade  deficit through a reduction in  the value of the dollar, was 
attractive. 
Caldwell suggested that the  1981  automobile voluntary import re- 
straint program could have yielded much broader benefits for the United 
States if  it had a three-dimensional  characteristic.  In exchange for a 
change in government policy that brought forth the voluntary restraint 
program, the industry could have been strongly encouraged to upgrade 
its product quality and productivity characteristics and organized labor 364  Barry EichengreedCharles W.  Parry/Philip Caldwell 
could  have  been expected to modify  the noncompetitive  labor cost 
structure and work practices. He agreed that the exchange rate was 
very important and pointed out that even if  the private sector fulfills 
its obligations in marketing, quality, cost structure, and labor manage- 
ment, the exchange rate can be a dominant factor. This, he argues, is 
part of government’s responsibility. 
He pointed out that the Chrysler situation  had some elements of such 
a three-way  deal.  The critical  parts of  the solution  to the Chrysler 
problem  were a timely  wage reduction and debt remission, both of 
which were largely engineered by people in government. The indus- 
trywide voluntary import restraint program could have been more fruit- 
ful if  three-way cooperation had been brought to bear. This was sug- 
gested by some from the industry, but the government was not willing. 
As a result, in 1982 wages grew, albeit at a slower rate. 
Unless the government, the unions, and management can work to- 
gether on trade and wage restraint and new investment, automakers 
may have to look at the world from a more supranational  point of view. 
There is no one in the auto industry who cannot produce anywhere in 
the world. In the case of a decision by automakers to move offshore, 
private sector  judgments might not be in sync with public interest and 
there would be a change in the role of the United States in the world. 
Anne Krueger emphasized the importance of macroeconomic  factors 
and pointed out some dangers of protecting basic industries. She sug- 
gested that there might be a tension between competition and protection 
of  basic  industries. The United  States has an interest in  the global 
system, so U.S. interests are similar to global interests. A free trade 
regime  must be maintained,  she argued, since it is key to the debt 
problem. 
What, Krueger asked rhetorically, is so  special about basic indus- 
tries? She pointed out that the service industry is no different; in fact, 
it is considered a service when a manufacturing firm contracts out work 
it would otherwise do in-house, whereas if the firm does the work itself 
it is manufacturing. 
Macroeconomic solutions,  Krueger suggested, are in the common 
interest. Furthermore, simply fixing or stabilizing exchange rates may 
be appealing, but without a reduction in the U.S. budget deficit there 
is no way to escape either high real interest rates or high inflation. 
Caldwell recognized the importance of macroeconomic factors, but 
wondered whether we all are willing to accept the consequences of 
living only by macroeconomic objectives even when they will demolish 
fundamental national objectives.  He reported a conversation with a 
key government economic official in  1979 who had been encouraging 
the free inflow  of  imports regardless  of  the adverse impact  on the 
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industries.  When it  was  suggested  that  if  imports  in  overwhelming 
magnitude are good for our country, it would be even better for our 
country if all automobile producers moved all of their production over- 
seas so that they could ship back to the United States products for the 
“consumer,”  he responded, “But you wouldn’t do that, would you?” 
with a hopeful note in his voice. 
Barry  Eichengreen  addressed  the importance  of  the dollar in ex- 
plaining the recent decline in basic industry employment, concluding 
that while the dollar has been key in predicting production in basic 
industries since 1981, its success was varied by industry. Cyclic factors, 
energy prices, wages, and productivity have also been very important, 
and the real exchange rate cannot explain the entire story. 
Much  of  the  discussion  revolved  around the globalization of  the 
aluminum industry and its implications. Charles Parry explained that 
he was content with Alcoa’s strategy of producing mostly secondary 
products in the United States. Venezuela, for example, has the bauxite 
and low energy costs to produce the primary product. There is also 
significant government support. National  development and employ- 
ment are the investment criteria. 
This strategy is not available in steel, he noted, since steel does not 
have the variety of uses and opportunities that aluminum has.  Steel 
production in the United States has fallen and will fall further, partly 
as a result of short-sighted management decisions and insufficient mod- 
ernization. Copper production has been driven out of the United States 
by environmental regulations, which makes ironic the World Bank fi- 
nancing of a dirty copper smelter about twenty-five miles south of the 
Mexican border, with prevailing winds to the north. Aluminum pro- 
duction will be all right as long as the share of manufacturing in GNP 
is relatively  stable. There  will  be  increased  dependence  on foreign 
sources of primary products, and continued high levels of research and 
development are needed to maintain a position in finished aluminum 
products. Environmental regulations are not very onerous in the alu- 
minum industry, he noted. 
Parry explained that aluminum-finished imports are moderately sen- 
sitive to exchange rates. There has not been much decrease yet due 
to the fallen dollar, but Alcoa’s calculations indicate that importers 
may be losing on each pound at the going exchange rate and prices. 
George Vojta pointed out that the case of Alcoa illustrated the general 
themes  of  increasing  deintegration  and globalization  of  production. 
Parry agreed, noting that Alcoa has no worries about internationalizing 
the upstream end of production, which is simply a result of comparative 
advantage. Alcoa does not worry about the national defense issue. 
James Schlesinger pursued  this line of  analysis, wondering  if  the 
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for the economy  of  the free world.  For  example, the  producers  of 
semiconductors on the Asian rim might need protecting. Compared to 
the consequences of the free Asian rim going to the Soviets, the risks 
associated with having aluminum production in Venezuela are not bad. 
He noted  also that the  United  States was  losing the edge in many 
militarily relevant areas, such as semiconductors and electronics, lead- 
ing to a dilution of our abilities to formulate policies for the alliance. 
Geoffrey Carliner mentioned a recent paper by Robert Lipsey which 
found that total exports of  U.S. firms to third parties from onshore 
and offshore production have not fallen. This suggests that the problems 
with U.S. exports are not with management. 
Parry addressed some questions associated with productivity-sharing 
arrangements. He acknowledged that the existence of industrywide  unions 
creates problems. There is a big difference, he argued, between the in- 
dividual worker and the union in attitudes toward work. Profit sharing of 
some sort is coming, however. Kaiser is doing what might be called pseudo- 
profit sharing now, and in 1989 Kaiser will start profit sharing. Alcoanei- 
ther can nor wants to decertify the union, and workers will not and should 
not give up collective bargaining. Profit sharing is the only way to equalize 
the base wage rate in healthy and unhealthy plants. Parry expressed hope 
for real productivity improvements, however, noting that during the re- 
cent strike Alcoa ran their operations with white-collar personnel and 
learned an enormous amount about productivity. 
Parry acknowledged that assurances of continued employment will 
be a necessary accompaniment to profit sharing. Incentives and sep- 
aration agreements will reduce the work force as productivity increases. 
Robert Ingersoll pointed out that the Japanese use bonuses to achieve 
flexible labor costs. Parry agreed that this would be another implication 
of profit sharing. Profit sharing as a methodology of  decreasing labor 
costs is one thing, but profit sharing could change the concept of the 
stakeholder and of the corporation. 
Lionel Olmer wondered where the constituency for free trade lies, 
in an environment of wrenching structural adjustment in basic indus- 
tries, cutthroat competition for market access, excess capacity, and 
fluctuating exchange rates. He has observed a trend to market sharing 
all over the world, in the aluminum industry as well as generally. Parry 
replied that the aluminum industry has always been for free trade. He 
expressed hope that bilateral negotiation with Japan, using the threat 
of a section 301 action, will lead to a bilateral agreement. European 
barriers too will come down by  1988. He suggested that enlightened 
management may explain this position. Olmer noted in  this context 
that the apparent differences between GM and Ford on protectionism 
disappear on closer inspection, as GM wants it both ways behind the 
scenes, seeking special treatment for its own imports. 